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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST^TE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A, BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
and Cross-Respondentsf
v.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANYr

Case No: 870267-CA

Defendant/Respondent
and Cross-Appellantf
and

Priority 14(b)

CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MARTf
Defendant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over thjLs appeal by virtue
of the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated July 8, 1987, and
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING^
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court entered pursuant to Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Said order granted the respondent Western

Suretyfs motion for relief from the judgment previously entered

-1-

by the court.

The cross-appeal of Western Surety is in the

alternative only, and appeals from that part of the final order
and judgment that denies Western Surety's motion to stay
proceedings.
STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court's decision under Rule 60(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure an abuse of its discretion?
The following issues are presented by the cross-appeal
and are contingent upon this court's disposition of the appeal.
Should the court affirm the trial court's order granting relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) , cross-appellant Western Surety does not
wish to disturb the order and judgment.

Should the court reverse

the trial court's order granting Rule 60(b) relief, Western
Surety cross-appeals from that part of the order denying its
motion to stay proceedings, raising the following issues:
2.

Was the denial of Western Surety's motion to stay

proceedings error in light of the pending interpleader action?
3.

Was the entry of summary judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs error in light of the prior filing of the interpleader
action?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ROLES
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may
be joined as defendants and required to

interplead when their claims are such that the
plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or
multiple liability. It is not ground for
objecting to the joinder that the claims of the
several claimants or the titles on which their
claims depend do not have a common origin or
are not identical but are adverse to and
independent of one another, or that the
plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole
or in part to any or all of the claimants.
A
defendant exposed to similar liability may
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim
or counterclaim.
The provisions of this rule
supplement and do not in any way lifait the
joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraudf etc.
On
motion and upon such terms as are justf the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the

judgment, order,or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides, in pertinent partf that:
(a) Filing Appeal From Final Orders and
Judgments. An appeal may be taken from a
district court to the Supreme Court from all
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the district court within the
time allowed by Rule 4.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Western Surety submits the following statement of the
case as the appellants' statement of the case is misleading and
inaccurate, and does not contain a statement of facts free of
legal conclusions and argument.
A.

Nature of the Case
This action involves a claim by George and Delia Baker

(hereinafter "the Bakers") against a motor vehicle dealer, Craig
Papa-Dakis dba Auto-Mart (hereinafter "dealer"), and a motor
vehicle dealer's bond issued by Western Surety Company to the
dealer.

The motor vehicle dealer's bond provided that Western

Surety would act as surety for the dealer and indemnify persons
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for loss suffered by reason of the dealer1s fraud or violation of
the Motor Vehicle Business Act if the dealer failed to so
indemnify such persons.

The total aggregate annual liability of

the bond, regardless of the number of claimq, is limited to
$20,000.00.

(See bond, R. at 10f reproduced! at A-l.)

The

Bakers filed a complaint against the dealer and Western Surety
alleging that the dealer had failed to provide clear and
marketable title on a vehicle sold to them.

(Complaint, R. at

2.)
At or near the time the Bakers filed their complaint,
two other actions were filed against the dealer and Western
Surety.

(See certified copies of complaints, at A-25 and A-28.)

In addition to the three lawsuits against the dealer and Western
Surety, Western Surety was advised by the Motor Vehicle Business
Administration for the State of Utah (hereinafter "Motor Vehicle
Department") that thirty-five claims had been filed in its office
against the dealer.

(R. at 71.)

Because the three lawsuits

pending against the dealer and Western Surety and the other
claims filed with the Motor Vehicle Department set forth claimed
damages in excess of $100,000 (greatly in excess of the $20,000
bond limit), Western Surety prepared to file an interpleader
action pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
to join all of the claimants in one action, ^o as to avoid
multiple liability and so that all claimants to the bond could be
heard and treated fairly and equitably.
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(Se<| Motion to Stay

Proceedings, R. at 68.) A somewhat confusing course of
proceedings followed due to the Bakers1 constant efforts to gain
undue advantage and priority over the other bond claimants and
thwart the interpleader proceedings.

The following events took

place even though the Bakers' counsel was advised that the bond
funds would be interpleaded so that all claimants could be
treated equitably.
The interpleader action was filed and was assigned to
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on December 16f 1986.

(See

Complaint for Interpleader, R. at 90f certified copy reproduced
at A-2.) Despite the filing of interpleaderf the Bakers sought
summary judgment against Western Surety in the action below
(which was before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson).

Judge

Wilkinson granted the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment

and

concurrently denied a motion brought by Western Surety to stay
proceedings, which was based upon the filing of the interpleader.
(Order and Summary Judgment dated 12/31/86, R. at 100.)
With judgment granted in their favor, the Bakers
attempted to frustrate the interpleader action further by
garnishing every insurance agent in the State of Utah licensed to
do Western Surety Business (R. at 110.)

These garnishments took

When the motion for relief from that judgment was heard on
February 13, 1987, Judge Wilkinson indicated that he did not
realize that interpleader had been filed at the time of the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, and that "in all
probability [he] would have granted a stay there," if he had
understood that interpleader had been filed. (Transcript of
2/13/87 hearing, p.21, R. at 329, reproduced at A-50.)
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place outside of the interpleader action where the bond funds
were held for the protection and benefit of all claimants for a
determination of distribution by the interpleader court.

Western

Surety, therefore, sought an order from the interpleader court
requiring the Bakers to interplead and satisfy their judgment
within the interpleader action.

(See Motion to Enjoin Execution,

reproduced at A-14.) Judge Moffat declined to rule on that issue
in the interpleader action, stating that Jucjge Wilkinson would
have to consider any motion regarding the judgment entered in
favor of the Bakers.

(See transcript of 2/5/87 hearing,

reproduced at A-17 to 20.) Western Surety, therefore, brought a
motion for relief from judgment before Judge Wilkinson.

Upon

reviewing the motion in light of the preceding circumstances,
Judge Wilkinson granted relief from judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and entered an order
and judgment, which reinstated the Bakers1 summary judgment but
required them to interplead to satisfy their claim and judgment.
(Order dated 4/7/87, R. at 294, reproduced ^t A-21.) This appeal
and cross-appeal followed.

B.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts.
The somewhat confusing course of proceedings in this

matter is best understood when examined in chronological
sequence.

As the facts in this case consist basically of the

proceedings, the course of proceedings and statement of facts are
set forth in strict chronological order below.
1.

On September 29, 1986, the Bakers filed a complaint

against the dealer and Western Surety with regard to a motor
vehicle transaction that took place between the Bakers and the
dealer*

The casef Civil No. C86-7427, was assigned to the

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. (Complaint, R. at 2.)
2.

At or about the time the Bakers filed the complaint

in this action, Western Surety was named in two other lawsuits
involving the motor vehicle dealer's bond issued to the dealer.
The first lawsuit was filed on or about September 22, 1986 by
Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. in the Fifth Circuit Courtf in and
for Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utahf styled
Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto-Mart
and Western Surety Company, Civil No. 86-57954CV.

The other

lawsuit was filed by Safeway Credit Union One on or about October
1/ 1986, in the Fifth Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt
Lake County, Salt Lake Department, styled Safeway Credit Union
One v. Robert Ockey, et al., Civil No. 86-CV-68912.

(See

certified copies of Complaints at A-25 and A-28.)
3.

On October 29, 1986, Western Surety, through its

counsel, received notice from the Utah Motor Vehicle Business
Administration that thirty-five complaints had been filed in its
office against the dealer.

(Letter and printout from

Administration, Ex. A to Motion to Stay Proceedings, R. at 71.)
Because of this notice and because the three pending lawsuits
against the bond set forth claims exceeding the $20f000.00 bond
limit, Western Surety took steps to obtain information on all of
the claims filed with the Motor Vehicle Department, preparatory
to filing an action in interpleader to join all of the bond
claimants in one action, such that the multiple claims could be
expeditiously resolved between the proper parties and such that
multiple lawsuits could be avoided.

(Motion to Stay Proceedings,

R. at 68; affidavit of John N. Braithwaite, R. at 87, reproduced
at A-ll.)
4.

Before the interpleader action was commenced, the

Bakers filed a motion for summary judgment against Western Surety
on its motor vehicle dealer's bond on December 5, 1986.

(R. at

43.)
5.

On December 9, 1986, Western Surety filed a motion

to stay the proceedings in the action below based upon the ground
that an interpleader action was necessary because numerous claims
existed against the $20,000.00 bond, the total of which greatly
exceeded the $20,000.00 bond limit.

The motion to stay was

further based upon the fact that the Bakers would be included in
the interpleader action with the other bond claimants.

(Motion

to Stay Proceedings, R. at 68.)
6.

On December 16, 1986, Western Surety filed the

interpleader action in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil

No* C86-9295.

The case was assigned to the Honorable Richard H.

Moffat and is still ongoing.
action as bond claimants*

The Bakers were included in the

(Affidavitf R. at 87; Complaint for

Interpleader, R. at 90, reproduced at A-2.)
7.

Subsequent to the filing of the interpleader, a

hearing was held on December 19f 1986 before Judge Wilkinson on
the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment and on Western Surety's
motion to stay proceedings in the action below.

The motion to

stay proceedings was denied and the Bakers' motion for summary
judgment was granted.

(Order and Summary Judgment dated

12/31/86, R. at 100.)
8.

Pursuant to interpleader, the bond funds were

deposited into the registry of the interpleader court (Civil No.
C86-9295) on December 29, 1986.

(See certified copy of Deposit

and Order at A-34; receipt of S.L. County Clerk, reproduced at
A-37.)
9.

On December 31, 1986, the order and summary judgment

in favor of the Bakers was signed and entered by Judge Wilkinson.
(R. at 100.)
10. Although the bond funds were held in the registry of
the court in interpleader, the Bakers sought satisfaction of
their judgment by serving writs of garnishment upon numerous
insurance agencies transacting business for Western Surety.

See footnote 1.
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execution attempts outside of interpleader, seeking an order
These writs were served between January 14, 1987 and
approximately January 27, 1987.

(Garnishment affidavit, R. at

117; writs of garnishment, R. at 112, 114, 119 through 152.)
11. Because the execution attempts placed Western Surety
at risk beyond the obligation of the bond and despite the
pendency of interpleader, Western Surety filed a motion on
January 16, 1987 in the interpleader action to enjoin the Bakers1
requiring the Bakers to interplead to satisfy their judgment.
The motion was scheduled to be heard on January 30, 1987.

(See

Motion to Enjoin Execution, reproduced at A-14; Amended notice of
hearing, reproduced at A-38.)
12. Despite the pending motion regarding satisfaction of
the Bakers1 judgment, the Bakers continued to serve writs of
garnishment frustrating insurance agencies transacting business
for Western Surety.

(R. at 119 through 152.)

Because of this

and because the execution attempts placed Western Surety at risk
beyond the obligation of the bond, Western Surety sought and
obtained an order on January 26, 1987 temporarily restraining the
Bakers from executing on their judgment until the motion
concerning satisfaction of that judgment coiild be heard.
13. Pending the hearing on the motion before Judge
Moffat in the interpleader action, Western Surety filed a notice
of appeal on January 29, 1987 from that part of the December 31,
1986 order denying its motion to stay proceedings.

The grounds

for the appeal were that Judge Wilkinson had erred by failing to
recognize the jurisdiction of the interpleader, and by granting
summary judgment in this action during the pendency of
interpleader, which exposed Western Surety to multiple liability.
It was Western Surety's position that the action should have been
stayed since the interpleader action had been filed and the
Bakers' claim was included in the interpleader.

(R. at 153.)

Contrary to the Bakers' assertion in its statement of facts that
the notice of appeal was filed in response to a letter from the
Utah State Insurance Commissioner , Western Surety filed its
notice of appeal to perfect its right to appeal pursuant to the
thirty (30) day requirement of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure on January 29, 1987.
14. On February 5f 1987 , Judge Moffat heard and
considered the motion to enjoin the Bakers' execution outside of
interpleader.

He denied the motion on the ground that any

limitation upon the satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the
Bakers would have to be set in place by Judge Wilkinson since he

The letter referred to by the Bakers is appended hereto at
A-41. A responsive letter written on behalf of Western Surety,
is also appended hereto at A-43. A second letter from the
Insurance Department that the Bakers have failed to direct the
court's attention to is appended hereto at A-47. This second
letter sets forth the Insurance Department's acknowledgment that
the problem addressed by the Bakers was being resolved through
the interpleader action.
4

The date of the hearing before Judge Moffat was changed from
January 30, 1987 to February 5, 1987 to accommodate the Bakers'
counsel.
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had entered the judgment.

In so doingf he dissolved the

temporary restraining order and stated that he thought the order
was wrongfully issued.

Contrary to the Bakers' bald assertions

that the TRO was improperly obtained in violation of numerous
specific provisions (See appellant's brief, p. 5, n. 4), Judge
Moffat did not set forth the specific reasons for vacating the
TRO other than the fact that he did not believe he had
jurisdiction over the judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson.

(See

transcript of 2/5/87 hearing, pp. 39-42, reproduced at A-17 to
A-20.)
15. Based upon Judge Moffat's ruling that he could not
limit execution on the judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson,
Western Surety brought the matter immediately to the attention of
Judge Wilkinson by filing a motion for relief from judgment or,
in the alternative, to limit execution to the interpleaded funds.
This motion was filed on February 6, 1987 and was heard on
February 13, 1987.

(R. at 161.)

16. Upon reviewing the memoranda and hearing the motion
on February 13, 1987, Judge Wilkinson, after realizing that the
interpleader action had been filed prior to his previous ruling,
indicated that he would grant relief from judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Transcript of

2/13/87 hearing, pp. 19-24, R. at 329, reproduced at A-48 to
A-53; reply memorandum, R.at 195.)

17. Because Judge Wilkinson had corrected the error
previously committed in the entry of the December 31, 1986 order
and judgment, appellate review of that order and judgment would
no longer be necessary as it was in essence moot. Western Surety
therefore voluntarily dismissed its appeal from that order on
March 26, 1987, pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, as dictated by Rule 37(a) when all issues on
appeal are moot.

(See certified copy of Stipulation for

Dismissal and Order of Dismissalf reproduced at A-54 and A-57,
respectively.)
18. The case was remitted from the Utah Supreme Court
back to the Third Judicial District Court on March 31, 1987.
(Remittitur, R. at 292, 293, reproduced at A-59.)
19. After resolving an objection to the proposed order
and judgment, Judge Wilkinson entered the order granting Rule
60(b) relief and the accompanying judgment on April 7, 1987.
(Order and Judgmentf R. at 294, reproduced at A-21.)
20. The Bakers filed their notice of appeal from the
order granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on
April 30, 1987.

(R. at 300.)

21. Western Surety filed its cross-appeal from the part
of the order denying its motion to stay proceedings on May 12,
1987.

(R. at 304.)

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted relief from judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b).

Upon motion for relief from the December

31, 1986 order, the trial judge recognized that the interpleader
action had been filed prior to the hearing on the Bakers1 motion
for summary judgment, and that interpleader jurisdiction had
thereby been established over the bond funds.

It was recognized

that the prior order had undercut the purpose of interpleader and
had thereby exposed Western Surety to multiple liability beyond
its obligations on the bond, and had given tfhe Bakers inequitable
advantage over the other bond claimants in the interpleader
action.
The trial court, in its discretion, saw a great need to
grant relief from judgment and correct the error made in the
entry of the previous order and judgment.

Good grounds existed

for relief under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1), 60(b)(5) and
60(b)(7).

Contrary to the Bakers1 argument, the relief granted

was not a correction of a clerical error under Rule 60(a) where
leave of the appellate court must be obtained if an appeal has
been docketed.

The motion was brought within the three month

requirement of Rule 60(b) and was brought in accordance with the
detailed requirements of that rule.

The motion was timely and

the trial court had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule
60(b).

Relief from the judgment was expressly granted under Rule

60(b).

The trial court has broad discretion to grant such relief

and should not be reversed unless this discretion was abused.
The decision must be affirmed if it is sustainable on any ground.
If it is determined that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)f then this court
should reverse the trial court's denial of Western Surety's
motion to stay proceedings.

The motion to stay proceedings was

based on the fact that the interpleader action had been commenced
and the Bakers were joined in that action.

The trial court

denied the motion to stay and granted the Bakers' motion for
summary judgment. This destroyed the purpose of the equitable
interpleader.
problem.

The relief granted under Rule 60(b) remedied this

If the order under Rule 60(b) is reversed, however, the

denial of the motion to stay proceedings must also be reversed,
as it was that order that precipitated the later problems in the
underlying action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING UNDER RULE 60(b)
SHOULD ONLY BE REVERSED IF THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
AND ITS DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IF IT IS
SUSTAINABLE ON ANY LEGAL BASIS.
The Bakers' appeal asserts that the trial court
committed error in granting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks a reversal of the
court's ruling.

The trial court, however, is endowed with

considerable latitude of discretion in granting or denying a
motion to relieve a party from a final judgment.

Airkem

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431
(1973).

Because of this broad discretion, the Utah Supreme Court

has stated that it "will reverse the trial court [on Rule 60(b)
decisions] only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly
established."

Id.

See also Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318,

1320 (Utah 1987).
In reviewing a trial court's decision, an appellate
court must also affirm the trial court if its decision is
supportable on any legal ground.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that:
Under the rules of appellate review, we affirm
the trial court if we can do so on any proper
ground even if the court below assigned an
incorrect reason for its ruling.
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 861 (Utah 1979).
This rule of appellate review applies even if the proper ground
was not raised in or considered by the lower court, and even if
the proper ground is not urged on appeal.

Qoodsel v. Department

of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974); accord
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers, Assoc, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461
P.2d 290, 293, n.2 (1969).
The circumstances of this case evidence the trial
court's proper use of its discretion in granting Western Surety
relief from the order and judgment entered on December 31, 1986.
Numerous legal grounds exist for the trial court's ruling,
including those indicated by the court from the bench.

The

arguments raised by the Bakers do not clearly establish an abuse
of discretion, and the order and judgment must be affirmed.
POINT II
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b) WAS
PROPERLY GRANTED.
A. The Motion For Relief From Judgment Was Properly and Timely
Filed.
The original order and judgment in this matter was
entered by Judge Wilkinson on December 31, 1986.

On February 6,

1987, Western Surety filed a motion entitled Motion for Relief
From Judgment or, in the alternative, to Limit Execution to the
Interpleaded Funds.

(The motion was filed after having

previously filed a motion in the interpleader action on January
16, 1987 regarding satisfaction of the Bakers judgment. Judge
Moffat ruled on that motion on February 5, 1987, indicating that
Judge Wilkinson would have to hear the matter because he had
entered the judgment.)

This motion, having been brought within

thirty-seven days of the entry of judgment, was proper and timely
under Rule 60(b).

Rule 60(b) (set forth verbatim supra) provides

that the motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
the reasons set forth in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than three months after the judgment or order was entered.
As the motion at issue was brought thirty-seven days after entry
of the order and judgment, the timeliness thereof under any part
of Rule 60(b) is obvious.

The Bakers contend that Western Surety's "motion to
amend" was untimely, citing Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

This argument is completely misplaced.

Western

Surety's motion was not a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 59.
(See Motion and reply memorandum, R. at 161, 195.) Moreover, the
court's order was explicitly entered pursuant to Rule 60(b) and
not Rule 59.

(See Order and Judgment, R. at 294, reproduced at

A-21.)
The Bakers appear to be urging that all post-judgment
motions, unless dealing only with the form of the judgment, must
be made pursuant to Rule 59.

This argument is groundless.

Rule

60(b) covers an array of problems that might arise or might
become apparent after the entry of a judgment.

It grants the

trial judge wide latitude to deal with certain problems "in the
furtherance of justice" at the trial court level where such
problems can best be handled without resort to appeal.
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule

The argument that the

motion is really a motion to amend raises nothing more than
semantics and attempts to divest the trial court of the broad
discretion it has to relieve a party from a judgment on any one
of the numerous grounds set forth in Rule 60(b).
B. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Grant Relief Under Rule
60(b) and Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting Relief
Pursuant Thereto as Numerous Grounds Support Its Decision.

1.

The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction To Entertain a

Motion Under Rule 60(b) and to Enter an Order Granting
Relief Pursuant Thereto.
The motion filed on February 6f 1987 sought relief from
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) or Rule 60 (a)f and, in the
alternative, sought an order limiting execution to the bond funds
held in interpleader.
60(b).

The court granted relief pursuant to Rule

Contrary to the Bakers1 contentions, Western Surety does

not claim that the court was acting under Rule 60(a).

Indeed,

the order entered on April 7, 1987 plainly states that "relief
from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule 60(b).w

(R. at 294.)

The Bakers argue that the court lacked jurisdiction
under Rule 60(a) because the appeal from the original order had
been docketed in the appellate court and leave of the appellate
court had not been obtained.

This is correct according to Rule

60(a), though entirely irrelevant to this appeal.

Western Surety

was fully aware of the requirements of Rule 60(a) in bringing its
motion, as the motion sought relief under Rule 60(a) and 60(b).
The day prior to the hearing on the motion, counsel for Western
Surety called the Supreme Court clerk's office to check on the
status of docketing and was informed that the appeal had not been
docketed.

(This information was later discovered to be erroneous

or miscommunicated.)

Western Surety did not learn that the

appeal had been docketed until the time of the hearing when
counsel for the Bakers represented that a telephone inquiry to

-?n-

the Supreme Court that morning revealed that the appeal was
docketed on February 11, 1987, two days before the hearing. (See
transcript of 2/13/87 hearing, p. 20, R. at 329.)
In light of this argument concerning the docketing of
the appeal and the requirements for correction of clerical errors
under Rule 60(a) when appeals are docketed, Judge Wilkinson
indicated that he had a very serious question concerning his
jurisdiction to rule.

Nevertheless, he saw the extreme need to

grant relief from judgment and, did so by exercising his
discretion "in the furtherance of justice."
that he abused his discretion.

The Bakers contend

Clearly, he did not.

The

fortuitous circumstance that the appeal was docketed two days
prior to hearing is inapposite here; it being relevant only to an
order under Rule 60(a).

The requirement of Rule 60(a) that leave

of the appellate court must be sought to correct clerical errors
does not appear in and does not govern Rule 60(b).
Clerical errors may be corrected at any time by the
court under Rule 60(a), even on its own initiative.

If an appeal

is pending and is docketed, the appellate court obviously needs
to be advised if clerical corrections are made to the order on
appeal.

Rule 60(b), on the other hand, governs something

entirely different from clerical errors and allows a specified
time period for motions brought pursuant thereto.

Rule 60(b)

expressly allows relief from a judgment to be sought thereunder
within three months from the entry of judgment.

A motion under

Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment and does
not extend the time for appeal.

See Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, and Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Thus, any appeal from the original order or judgment

must be perfected within thirty days despite a pending or
anticipated motion under Rule 60(b) 5 .

If such relief could not

be sought if an appeal were filed, the three month allowance
would be hollow and effectively reduced to one month.
Rule 60(b), however, does not require the trial court to
seek leave of the appellate court to grant relief from its own
judgment.

The trial court is vested with discretion to grant

relief from its own judgments if it sees fit.
this are readily seen.
is disturbed.

The reasons for

Obviously, if relief is denied, nothing

If relief is granted, the original order appealed

from is no longer a final and appealable order and the appeal
will not go forward.

5

Western Surety filed its appeal on January 29, 1987 from the
order entered on December 31, 1986. The filing of the appeal at
that time was necessitated by the thirty-day requirement of Rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Faced with the
problem of being executed against on a judgment entered against
it based on a motor vehicle dealer's bond, while that bond was
the subject of an interpleader action that involved the Bakers1
claim as well as the claims of other bond claimants, it was
Western Surety's position that the proceedings before Judge
Wilkinson should have been stayed pending proceedings in
interpleader. Although its right to appeal was perfected,
Western Surety attempted to have the matter resolved below so
that the delay of an appeal would be unnecessary. (If the trial
court corrects its own errors, it is simply unnecessary for the
Supreme Court to make the correction.)

Finally, it is important to point out that the Supreme
Court remitted the case back to the district court prior to the
entry of the April 7, 1987 order.

Western Surety voluntarily

dismissed its appeal from the December 31, 1986 order on March
26, 1987 pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure* This was done because Judge Wilkinson, upon hearing
the motion for relief from judgment on February 13, 1987,
indicated that he would grant the motion, correcting the error at
issue on appeal.

Thus, the appeal was no longer necessary as the

only issue on appeal was mooted.

Western Surety accordingly

filed a stipulation and motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule
37(b) as dictated by the latter part of Rule 37(a) when all
issues on appeal are moot.

The case was remitted from the Utah

Supreme Court back to the Third Judicial District Court on March
31, 1987.

(Remittitur, R. at 292, reproduced at A-59.)

The

order granting relief from judgment was entered seven days later
on April 7, 1987.
A-21.)

(Order and Judgment, R. $t 294, reproduced at

Thus, the Supreme Court had no involvement with the case

at the time the order was entered in any event.

The Rule 60(b)

motion was brought in accordance with the detailed requirements
of that rule and the trial court properly entertained and granted
the motion by order of April 7, 1987.
2.

Numerous Grounds Existed For Granting Relief

Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and the Trial Court Did Not Abuse
Its Discretion in Granting Such Relief.

At or about the time the Bakers filed their complaint
against Western Surety, two other lawsuits were filed against
Western Surety also claiming rights to the bond funds.

(See

certified copies of Complaints at A-25 and A-28.) Additionally,
Western Surety was advised by the Motor Vehicle Department that
approximately thirty-five other claims had been filed against the
bonded dealer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-3-18.

(R. at 71.)

Section 41-3-18 provides that a person who suffers damage by
reason of fraud or other certain violations of the Motor Vehicle
Code may "maintain an action for recovery against the dealer,...
and the sureties upon their respective bonds."
The motor vehicle dealerfs bond issued by Western Surety
to the dealer pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1) provides
that Western Surety shall act as surety for the dealer pursuant
to Section 41-3-16(1) and indemnify persons for loss suffered by
reason of violation of the conditions contained therein (fraud
and certain violations of the Motor Vehicle Code) if the dealer
fails to so indemnify such persons, "in the total aggregate
annual penal sum of Twenty Thousand and no/100 Dollars
($20,000.00), as required by Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1)." (R. at
10.)

The bond is reproduced at A-l.
Because multiple claims existed against the dealer and

the bond, Western Surety was exposed to multiple liability.

The

sum of the claims in the three lawsuits exceeded the $20,000.00
bond limit, while the sum of all claims received from the Motor

Vehicle Department exceeded $100,000.00.

Western Surety was

therefore entitled, pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, to require the claimants to interplead their
claims against the bond.

The Utah Supreme Court has explained

the interpleader rule as follows:
An action in interpleader is a proceeding in
equity in which a person who has possession of
money or property which may be owned or claimed
by others seeks to rid himself of risk of
liability, or possible multiple liability, by
disclaiming his interest and submitting the
matter of ownership for adjudicatipn by the
court.
Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980).
While Western Surety was preparing to file an
interpleader action to join all claimants in one action so that
all claims could be equitably resolved, the Bakers filed a motion
for summary judgment in the action below.

This occurred despite

the fact that counsel for the Bakers was advised that the
interpleader action was being filed and that it would include the
Bakers1 claim.

Western Surety responded by filing a motion to

stay the proceedings.

This latter motion was based on the ground

that an interpleader action, which would include the Bakers1
claim, would be filed as soon as information on the numerous
claims was received from the Motor Vehicle Department.

(R. at

68.)
Western Surety filed the interpleader action on December
16, 1986, naming all of the bond claimants known to it, including
the Bakers.

The action was assigned to Judge Moffat and Civil

No. C86-9295.

(R. at 90.)

A certified copy of the complaint for

interpleader is attached at A-2. Interpleader jurisdiction was
thereby established.

It is the well-established and universally

accepted rule that interpleader jurisdiction is established under
Rule 22 by the filing of the complaint for interpleader.
Moore's Federal Practice 1122.10, p.22-99.

3A

(This is contrary to

federal statutory interpleader where deposit of the funds is
necessary for jurisdiction.)
In cases outside statutory interpleader,
deposit is not a jurisdictional requisite to
interpleader, although deposit is universally
permitted and often required within the
discretion of the court as a means of
safeguarding the disputed fund and facilitating
execution of judgment.
Id.

See also Percival Const. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers,

Inc., 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976).

Utah's interpleader rule is

identical to Rule 22(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Interpleader jurisdiction was therefore established when
the complaint was filed on December 16, 1986 and the $20,000.00
bond became the res of that action and was under the jurisdiction
of the interpleader court.

The fact that the actual bond funds

were not deposited into the registry of the court until December
29, 1986 is of no jurisdictional significance.

It was tendered

into court in any event before the entry of the order and
judgment on December 31, 1986.

(See clerk's receipt, reproduced

at A-37; Deposit and Order, at A-34.)
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The Bakers1 motion for suzopag-y ju^gpejit and Western
Surety's motion to stay proceedings were kea^d on December 19f
1986.

Judge Wilkinson was advised by affidavit of counsel for

Western Surety that the interpleader action h&d been commenced.
(Affidavit of John N. Braithwaite, R-.--.sat:r8-7*-i Despite this fact,
Judge Wilkinson denied the motion to* srta-y-ptoeeedings and granted
the Bakers summary judgment.

(It Jjsfetr he^ais^

apparent that

Judge Wilkinson did not fully undejr.sfeaftd fch&bointerpleader had
been filed.

See footnote 1.)

on December 31, 1986.

The order an<i judgment was entered

(R. at 100.)

Xhe ^ntRE of that order and

judgment placed Western Surety at ci-sk beyond its surety
obligation on the bond, thereby ere-a-fei-na-the-very problem that
interpleader was designed to avoidl A*©T"r multiple liability.
Based upon the reasoning,pf_g,nfcety CQ«. of the Pacific v.
Piver, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 197 C<fi« Rp%€* 531 (Cal. App.
Dept. Super. Ct. 1983), and other cases mvo-fev^ng interpleader of
bond funds, Western Surety moved the interpleader court to enjoin
execution upon the judgment obtamea_Dy .cne twicers outside of the
interpleader action, and for an^prder c£§gStfina the Bakers to
interplead and satisfy their claim (now reduced to judgment)
within the interpleader action.

(See certitied copy of Motion to

Enjoin Execution, at A-14.)
The Piver case was directly on point.

In that case, a

surety filed a cross-complaint in interpleader after learning of
multiple claims against a statutory contractors license bond.

Before filing its cross-complaint for interpleaderf one of the
claimants obtained a judgment against the surety and the
principal in a separate action.

Upon the surety's motion the

trial court restrained all parties from instituting or further
prosecuting any other proceeding which affected the rights and
obligations of the parties to the interpleader action.

The order

included a restraint upon Shamrockf the claimant with the
judgmentf from executing upon or enforcing that judgment.

The

appellate court affirmed the trial court's order and stated that:
The circumstance that Shamrock's claim has been
reduced to judgment does not preclude such
restraint.
* * *

A restraint against enforcing a judgment, as
here, may be essential to the protection of
interpleader jurisdiction. [Citations omitted]
Indeed, there may be situations in which the
various claimants to particular property or a
fund should be permitted to proceed to judgment
in a proper forum of their choice, being
restrained in the interpleader action only as
to the enforcement of any judgment so obtained.
That is the established practice under Rule 22,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire (1967) 386 U.S. 523,
535, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 1206, 18 L.Ed.2d 270, 278;
[further citations omitted]) As revised in
1975, the California statute is in conformity
with Rule 22.
Id. at 532.

Accord Board of Ed. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.

App.3d 977, 159 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
Piver presented a situation identical to that before
Judge Moffat.

The Bakers had a judgment against Western Surety

on the bond that was the subject matter of the interpleader
action.

They sought to enforce that judgment outside of

interpleader, claiming priority by virtue of their judgment.

If

allowed to enforce their judgment outside of interpleaderr the
purpose of interpleader would be destroyed and Western Surety
would be subject to multiple judgments and potential liability
beyond its obligations as a surety.

Such would be contrary to

the interpleader rule, the statute requiring the bond, and the
bond itself.
Another case with circumstances similar to the case at
hand is Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Md. v. Santa Monica Fin. Co.,
6 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).

In that case, a bond

claimant that had filed a separate action pifior to the filing of
interpleader was enjoined from further pursuing that action and
required to interplead.

A synopsis of this case appears in the

addendum at A-60.
Judge Moffat denied the motion before him, however, on
the ground that it should be handled by Judge Wilkinson, who had
entered the judgment in the first instance. (See transcript of
2/5/87 hearing, pp. 39-42, at A-17 to A-20.)

The matter was then

brought immediately to the attention of Judge Wilkinson.

In

considering the motion for relief from judgment, Judge Wilkinson
granted relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) from the prior order and
judgment entered by him on December 31, 1986.

The relief granted

was consistent with the equitable interpleader rule and the
reasoning of Piver and Santa Monica.

As will be demonstrated

below, good grounds existed for relief from the prior judgment.

First of allf Judge Wilkinson recognized that the
judgment rendered against Western Surety was in connection with a
motor vehicle dealerfs bond, which was governed by Utah Code Ann.
§41-3-16(1) and the language of the bond itself.

The statute

provides that:
Before a new or used motor vehicle dealer's
license is issued the applicant shall file with
the administrator a good and sufficient
corporate surety bond in the amount of
$20,000.00. The corporate surety shall be duly
licensed to do business within the state. The
bond shall be approved as to form by the
attorney general, and conditioned that the
applicant will conduct business as a dealer
without fraud or fraudulent representation, and
without violation of this chapter, and may be
continuous in form. The total aggregate annual
liability on the bond to all persons making
claims may not exceed $20,000.00. [Emphasis
added.]
The bond itself similarly provides that:
The total aggregate annual liability of this
bond, regardless of the number of claims, may
not exceed $20,000.00.
(R. at 10, bond reproduced at A-l.)
Upon hearing the 60(b) motion and being advised of the
circumstances that had developed in this case since the entry of
the December 31, 1986 order and judgment, Judge Wilkinson
recognized that an error had been made.

He then realized that

interpleader had been filed prior to the hearing on the motion
for summary judgment and that the order and judgment had been
entered in error.

In his discretion, he corrected that error.

Rule 60(b) allows such relief.

The Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals, interpreting the substantively similar Federal Rule
60(b) , has allowed correction of judicial errors under Rule
60(b)(1).

See Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co., 621

F.2d 1062f 1067 (10th Cir. 1980).

This is particularly so when,

as here, the error is recognized by the rendering judge and is
the result of judicial oversight.

Id. at 1067.

The grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) include
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."

The

circumstances that arose in this case following the entry of the
December 31, 1986 order, warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
Although judgment was entered in favor of the Bakers "against
defendant Western Surety Company,"

Western Surety fully

anticipated the Bakers to satisfy their judgment within the
interpleader action since the bond was the res of the Bakers'
claim and judgment against Western Surety and was the subject of
the interpleader.
When the Bakers attempted to garnish Western Surety
assets, Western Surety asked the interpleader court to require
the Bakers to interplead to satisfy their judgment.

Although the

motion was based on substantial case authority (Piver, Santa
Monica, and cases cited therein), Judge Moffat did not feel like
he could limit the judgment entered by another judge and he
declined to limit the execution.

At that point, it was obvious

that either a mistake had been made with the entry of the order
reflecting a judgment "against Western Surety," or it was error

to have entered the judgment at all in view of the
filing of interpleader.

Judge Wilkinson expressly recognized

this as a mistake in granting relief from the judgmentf stating
n

[i]f your judgment just says a blanket judgment against Western

Surety, then I think that's incorrect."

(Transcript of 2/13/87

hearing, p.24, R. at 329.) Clearly, the rendering judge has
discretion to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) from a mistake
made in the preparation of an order.
The Bakers argue that because the order was approved as
to form, relief cannot be granted therefrom.

Approval of the

order as to form, however, does not in any way negate the fact
that a mistake was made in the order, and it certainly does not
negate inadvertence in preparation and approval of the order.
Approval of the form of an order by counsel merely indicates
counselfs belief that the order reflects the judge's ruling.
Furthermore, the Bakers contradict themselves by so arguing.

The

Bakers argue, on the one hand, that the relief granted was
substantive (see point I, part C, of Appellant's brief), and on
the other hand, that the relief granted was with respect to the
form of the order and that Western Surety could not complain,
having approved the form.

As pointed out in the argument, supra,

relief under Rule 60(b) is not limited to either the form of an
order or its substance.

Rule 60(b) allows relief from orders and

judgments for an array of problems, all within the rendering

court's discretion.

The relief granted may be one of form or

substance.
Grounds for relief from the previous order also existed
under Rule 60(b)(5), which provides for relief when the judgment
is void.

There are three ways in which a judgment can be void.
A judgment is void only if the court which
rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law.

Brimhall v. Mecham, 27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (1972).
In the case below, the court lacked jurisdiction over
the bond funds, as they had come within the jurisdiction of the
interpleader court on December 16, 1986.

As set forth in the

argument, supra, interpleader jurisdiction is established when
the complaint is filed.

With the commencement of interpleader,

the bond, and specifically the bond funds, became the res of
interpleader and the interpleader court took jurisdiction over
them.

Thus, Judge Wilkinson lacked jurisdiction over the bond

funds and, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to enter the type of
judgment that was entered on December 31, 1986.
Many cases state two requisites for a valid
judgment, that the court: have jurisdiction
over the subject matter; and jurisdiction over
the parties (the crucial issue usually being
jurisdiction over the defendant) that is needed
for the type of judgment, i.e., in personam,
quasi in rem, or in rem, that it renders.
7 Moore's Federal Practice K6Q.25121, p.60-225.
Because the claim against Western Surety was necessarily
dependent upon the bond and Western Suretyfs liability was

limited to the $20,000.00 bond funds, Judge Wilkinson lacked the
quasi in rem jurisdiction necessary to enter a judgment against
Western Surety.

Rather, the judgment must be limited to the bond

funds which are in interpleader.

The judgment entered "against

Western Surety" on December 31, 1986 was therefore void since
Judge Wilkinson lacked the jurisdiction (quasi in rem) over
Western Surety that was necessary to enter such a judgment.
Judge Wilkinson granted relief from that void judgment and
entered a judgment against the bond funds held in interpleader.
The judgment of December 31, 1986 was void for a second
reason.

By entering the judgment after interpleader was

commenced, Western Surety was exposed to multiple liability, and
specifically liability in excess of its obligations as surety,
undercutting the purpose of Rule 22 Interpleader.

The Bakers

properly should have been required to interplead to prove and
satisfy their claim.

The court therefore "acted in a manner

inconsistent with due process of law."

Brimhall, at 526.

Western Surety was entitled, by virtue of Rule 22 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to require the Bakers and all other
persons having claim against the bond to interplead their claims.
Due process of law was thwarted by the entry of the December 31,
1986 judgment.

The judgment was therefore void on that basis.

Judge Wilkinson properly granted relief from that void judgment
and entered a judgment in favor of the Bakers against the bond
funds, effectively requiring them to interplead to satisfy their

judgment.

This new judgment is consistent with due process of

law and consistent with legal precedent involving interpleader of
bond funds.

See Piver and Santa Monica.

In addition to the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1)
and 60(b)(5), relief from judgment was properly granted for
reasons under Rule 60(b)(7).

Rule 60(b)(7) grants a trial court

wide discretion to grant relief from an order or judgment for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."

Judge Wilkinson recognized the problem that had

developed with the entry of the December 31, 1986 judgment.

He

recognized that it exposed Western Surety to multiple liability
and undercut the purpose of interpleader, while granting undue
advantage to the Bakers over the other bond claimants.

(See

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Glassell-Taylor & Robinson, 156 F.2d
519, 523 (5th Cir. 1946), where it was stated that one purpose of
interpleader is to prevent a race to the swift and provide
equitable consideration of multiple claims.)

Relief from

judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) was therefore justified.

As set

forth in Point I of the argument, the trial judge has wide
discretion in granting relief from judgment, and his decision
must be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal basis, even if
the trial judge assigned an incorrect reason for his ruling and
did not consider the appropriate ground.

Allphin Realty, at 861.

Judge Wilkinson did not abuse his discretion in granting relief

from judgment, and his order and judgment of April 7, 1987 should
be affirmed*
POINT III
THE BAKERS1 CONTENTION THAT NO GROUNDS EXISTED
FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b) AND THAT NO GROUNDS
EXISTED FOR LIMITING THEIR JUDGMENT TO THE
INTERPLEADED FUNDS IS BASED ON A
MISUNDERSTANDING OF WESTERN SURETY'S OBLIGATION
ON THE BOND AND A MINUNDERSTANDING OF INTERPLEADER.
Western Surety's obligation as a surety arises by virtue
of its bond. The obligation of the bond is expressly limited to
an aggregate of $20,000 on an annual basis, regardless of the
number of claims.

The Bakers suggest that this limitation is

debatable under the case of Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, Inc. v.
Zdunich, 668 P.2d 557 (Utah 1983).

To the contrary, the

limitation is recognized by Dillon Oldsmobile to be in accordance
with the statute.
In Dillon Oldsmobile, the court examined two motor
vehicle dealer's bonds issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§41-3-16.

Although the language of the two bonds was identical,

they had been treated separately by two trial courts below and
had been interpreted differently.

One of the trial courts had

ruled that there was no aggregate limitation on the surety's
liability on the bond and the other trial court had ruled to the
contrary.

The cases were consolidated for appeal.

The Supreme

Court identified the determinative issue to be whether the
language of the bonds was more comprehensive with respect to the

surety's liability than is required by Section 41-3-16(1).

The

bonds in Dillon Oldsmobile provided that the surety was bound
"to idemnify any and all persons, firms and
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of
violation of the conditions hereafter
contained, in the penal sum of Twenty Thousand
Dollars ($20,000.00). . . for the payment of
which, well and truly to be made, ye bind
ourselves. . . . "
[Emphasis original.]
Id. at 559.
After examining this language and the statute itself,
the court held:
By the literal language of the bonds, the
sureties rendered themselves liable up to a
maximum of $20,000.00 for any loss suffered by
any and all persons. [Emphasis original*]
Id. at 561.

The court further held that where the terms of the

bond are more comprehensive than required by statute, the surety
is bound by the language of the bond.
The bond issued by Western Surety in this case is
entirely different from the bonds in Dillon Oldsmobile.

The bond

in the instant matter is limited to a total aggregate annual
liability of $20,000.00.

This limitation is in accordance with

Section 41-3-16(1) and is in accordance with the statutory
requirement recognized by Dillon Oldsmobile .

b

Id. at 561.

It is

It must also be noted that the Utah Legislature amended
§41-3-16(1) and §41-3-18 in 1983. The amendments to these two
sections made it clear that "the total aggregate annual liability
on the bond to all persons making claims may not exceed
$20,000.00." The amendments also enacted specific limitation
periods, requiring claims to be filed with the administrator
within one year after the cause of action arises.

a well established rule of law that a surety may only be held for
the amount stipulated in the bond.

See Western Surety Co. v.

Childers, 372 P.2d 214f 215 (Okla. 1962).

The judgment in this

case was, therefore, properly limited to the bond funds held in
interpleader as Western Suretyfs only obligation arises by reason
of the bond and the bond funds were under the jurisdiction of
interpleader.
The Bakers contend that the bond is nothing more than a
contract and that Western Surety breached its obligation on the
contract by failing to pay the Bakers once judgment had been
entered against the dealer and once summary judgment was entered
against Western Surety on December 31, 1986.

This contention is

apparently based on a misunderstanding of the bond itself, as well
as a misunderstanding of the consequence of the filing of the
interpleader and the basis of Judge Wilkinson's order granting
relief from judgment.
First of all, the Bakers misunderstand the obligation of
Western Surety on the bond.

The judgment entered against the

dealer was a default judgment.

The Bakers plainly misread the

bond in asserting that Western Surety was obligated to pay all
judgments rendered against the dealer.

With respect to judgments

against the dealer, the bond provides that if the principal [the
dealer] indemnifies persons for loss suffered by reason of fraud,
violations of the motor vehicle business act and certain other
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles, and pays judgments

adjudged against him on account of fraud or violation of the
designated laws respecting motor vehicles, then the surety's
obligation is null and void. (See bond, R. at 10, reproduced at
A-l.)
By the plain wording of the bond, Western Surety is only
obligated to indemnify persons for loss suffered by reason of
fraud and violation of the Motor Vehicle Code and other laws
respecting commerce in motor vehicles, and is only so obligated
as a surety.

That is, Western Surety's obligation does not arise

unless the dealer fails to indemnify persons for the identified
losses.

Western Surety is certainly not obligated on its bond

for all judgments entered against the dealer.

Ordinary money

judgments against the dealer, which do not involve fraud or a
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code do not raise an obligation
under the bond.

The bond is statutorily required for the

specific reasons detailed in Utah Code Ann. §41-3-16(1).
The default judgment entered against the dealer did not
establish fraud or a violation of the motor vehicle code.

It is

a generally accepted rule that a default judgment against one
defendant is not binding on another defendant and does not
establish facts against the answering defendant.

See, Clugston

v. Moore, 655 P.2d 29, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
The Bakers1 contention that Western Surety agreed to pay
attorney's fees in cases successfully prosecuted to judgment
furthers their misreading of the bond.

The bond provides that

"said bounden principal" shall pay reasonable attorney's fees in
cases successfully prosecuted to judgment.
The second error with the Bakers' contention that
Western Surety has breached its obligation on the bond deals with
a misunderstanding of interpleader.

The interpleader action was

commenced on December 16, 1986, before the hearing on the Bakers'
motion for summary judgment and fifteen days prior to the entry
of the order granting the Bakers summary judgment.

As indicated

in the argument, supra, interpleader jurisdiction was established
by the filing of the complaint.

At that time, the bond became

the res of interpleader and was under the jurisdiction of the
interpleader court.

Thus, the entire obligation of Western

Surety on its bond became the subject of interpleader.

This is

dictated by the bond itself and by the statute, Utah Code Ann.
§41-3-16.
When the circumstances following entry of the summary
judgment were related to Judge Wilkinson by the motion for relief
from judgment, he recognized his previous error and the existence
of jurisdiction in the interpleader court.

Upon hearing the

motion, Judge Wilkinson stated that if he had understood that the
interpleader action was filed at the time of hearing the Bakers'
motion for summary judgment and Western Surety's motion to stay
proceedings, "in all probability [he] would have granted a stay
there."

(Transcript of 2/13/87 hearing, p. 21, R- at 329,

reproduced at A-50.) Judge Wilkinson, therefore, corrected his

previous error and granted relief from the prior judgment.

He

re-entered judgment in favor of the Bakers, but directed that
satisfaction of that judgment was limited to the bond funds under
the jurisdiction of the interpleader court.

Legal basis for such

a limitation had been shown in the strikingly similar Piver case
and the Santa Monica case.

Execution is limited to the bond

funds because they became the jurisdiction of the interpleader
court prior to the entry of judgment and because those funds are
the extent of Western Suretyfs liability.
The requirement that the Bakers interplead to satisfy
their judgment is consistent with Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and due process of law.

It is by the very

authority cited by Western Surety that the Bakers are even
entitled to have summary judgment entered in their favor outside
of interpleader.

See Pivery at 532.

Indeed, with the filing of

interpleader, Judge Wilkinson could have declined to enter
judgment and required the Bakers to interplead to prove their
claim in addition to satisfying it.

It is Only by the procedure

outlined in Piver that a bond claimant is able to obtain a
judgment outside of interpleader once it is commenced.
The cases cited by the Bakers concerning indefinite
stays of execution are not applicable.
stay of execution in this case.

There is no indefinite

Taylor National, Inc. v. Jensen

Brothers Construction, 641 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982), held that the
trial court in that case had erred by permanently staying

execution of the judgment entered.

Id. at 154. The court

further stated that a party receiving a judgment is entitled to
have that judgment enforced by the granting court.

IcL

The

order and judgment entered by Judge Wilkinson on April 7, 1987 is
not in conflict with Taylor National.
permanently stayed in this action.
been stayed at all.

Execution has not been

In factf execution has not

Execution is merely directed to the

interpleaded funds in accordance with Rule 22 interpleader.
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916),
cited by the Bakers, is likewise inapposite.
CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS WAS
ERROR IN LIGHT OF THE PENDING INTERPLEADER
ACTION AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GRANTED OUTSIDE OF INTERPLEADER.
Western Surety1s cross-appeal concerns only the denial
of Western Surety's motion to stay proceedings and is in the
alternative only, contingent upon this court's disposition of the
Bakers' appeal.

Western Surety believes that Judge Wilkinson

properly granted Rule 60(b) relief in the furtherance of justice
and that the new order and judgment entered on April 7, 1987 is
consistent with the equity of interpleader and case law regarding
interpleader of bond funds.

Should this court affirm Judge

Wilkinson's order granting relief pursuant to Rule 60(b), Western
Surety does not wish to disturb the order and judgment.

If this

court, however, reverses the trial court's order, Western Surety

contends that its motion to stay proceedings should have been
granted in the first instance and, therefore, cross-appeals from
that part of the order denying its motion to stay proceedings.
As established in the argument, sufrra, interpleader
jurisdiction was established on December 16, 1986.

At that time,

the bond funds were under the jurisdiction of the interpleader
court.

Neither Western Surety nor any bond claimant could

dispose of or execute upon the funds absent an order from the
interpleader court.

These funds were deposited into the registry

of the court on December 29, 1986, prior to the entry of summary
judgment in favor of the Bakers.

Western Surety was entitled

pursuant to Rule 22 to require all bond claimants to interplead
their claims.

The express purpose of Rule 22 is to avoid

multiple liability.

Hearing was held on Western Surety's motion

to stay proceedings and the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment
on December 19, 1986.

The trial court was advised by affidavit

of counsel for Western Surety that the interpleader had been
commenced.

For some reason, Judge Wilkinson failed to recognize

this fact initially and he denied the motion to stay proceedings
and granted the motion for summary judgment.

He later

acknowledged that had he fully understood that interpleader had
been commenced he, in all probability, would have granted a stay.
(See footnote 1.)
The denial of the motion to stay proceedings was clear
error.

The granting of summary judgment undercut the purpose of
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the interpleader by exposing Western Surety to multiple
liability.

The Bakers were included in the interpleader ation

and should have been required to interplead their claim.
The denial of the motion to stay proceedings was also error in
that the court lacked the jurisdiction over Western Surety
necessary to render the judgment entered on December 31, 1986. 7
Moore's Federal Practice H60.25f2], p.60-225.

The bond funds,

which represented the extent of Western Surety's liability, were
no longer at the disposal of Western Surety.

The court had

jurisdiction over those funds in interpleader.

The trial court

below lacked quasi in rem jurisdiction over Western Surety and
should have granted a stay of proceedings and required the Bakers
to interplead to prove their claim.
POINT II
WESTERN SURETY'S CROSS-APPEAL WAS TIMELY AND
PROPER UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES.
The Bakers contend that Western Surety's cross-appeal
was untimely and is barred by the prior dismissal of the appeal
from the December 31 f 1986 order.

These contentions are without

merit, as they fail to consider the nature of the orders entered
by the court below.
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that an appeal may be taken from all "final orders and
judgments."

The advisory committee note to Rule 3(a) indicates

that the rule retains the "final judgment rule" of the prior
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appellate rule in Rule 72(a).

On January 29, 1987, Western

Surety appealed from part of the order and judgment entered on
December 31, 1986f pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

This was necessary for the perfection of

Western Surety's right to appeal, despite a pending motion in the
interpleader court seeking to require the Bakers to interplead to
satisfy their judgment.

As entered, the order and judgment of

December 31, 1986 ended the litigation and left no claim
remaining for resolution.

It was therefore a final order and

judgment.
Although its right to appeal was perfected by the filing
of the notice of appeal on January 29, 1987, Western Surety
attempted to have the matter resolved below so that the delay of
an appeal would be unnecessary.

Judge Wilkinson resolved the

matter by granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The order granting relief from
judgment and the new judgment was entered on April 7,1987.

At

that point, the December 31, 1986 order and judgment ceased to be
a viable, final and appealable order.

Relief from that judgment

had been granted and a new order and judgment was entered.
Accordingly, no appeal could lie from the order entered on
December 31, 1986.
Because appellate review would no longer be necessary
and because the issues involved with Western Surety's appeal of
the December 31, 1986 order were mooted, Western Surety
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voluntarily dismissed its appeal from that order by filing a
stipulation for dismissal pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure as dictated by Rule 37(a) when all
issues in the appeal are mooted.
reproduced at A-54.)

(Stipulation for dismissal,

By order of the Supreme Court of the State

of Utah, the appeal from the December 31, 1986 order was
dismissed pursuant to Rule 37(b). (Order of dismissal, reproduced
at A-57.)
The order granting relief from judgment and the new
judgment was entered by the court below on April 7, 1987. The
December 31, 1986 order and judgment was, therefore, no longer a
viable order and judgment.

Furthermore, Western Surety's appeal

from that order had become moot.

Contrary to the Bakers

contentions, Western Suretyfs cross-appeal of the denial of its
motion to stay proceedings runs from the date of the final order
entered on April 7, 1987, rather than from the prior order.

This

is explained by the authors of a well accepted work on Federal
Practice and Procedure, as follows:
An application for relief from a judgment under
Rule 60(b) also does not extend the time for
taking an appeal. Even if the court hears and
denies the motion before the appeal time would
have run, the appeal must be taken within the
prior period measured from the date of the
judgment, not from the denial of the motion.
If, however, the court grants the motion and
enters a new judgment, the time for appeal will
date from the entry of that judgment. [Emphasis
added.]
11 C> Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §2871
(1973).
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The contention that the appeal is untimelyf and that
such would be obvious if the court had entered two separate
orders on separate pieces of paper on December 31, 1986, is
without merit.

The order denying Western Surety's motion to stay

proceedings, standing alone, was not a final order.
did not end the litigation.
(Utah 1987).

Said order

See Crosland v. Peck, 738 P.2d 631

The order denying the motion to stay is only

appealable if, and when, a final order or judgment has been
entered.
1987.

The final order and judgment was entered on April 7,

The order and judgment of December 31, 1986 is no longer

viable and is no longer appealable as it is not a final order and
judgment in this case.

The Bakers filed their notice of appeal

from the April 7, 1987 order on April 30, 1987. Western Surety
filed its cross-appeal from the part of the order denying its
motion to stay proceedings on May 12, 1987, twelve days after the
Bakers1 notice of appeal.

Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure provides that:
If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of
appeal within 14 days after the date on which
the first notice of appeal was filed or within
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a)
of this rule, whichever period last expires.
The notice of cross-appeal was timely filed within the above
rule.
The fallacy of the Bakers1 contention that Western
Surety's cross-appeal is barred by its prior dismissal of the
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appeal from the earlier order, and that its cross-appeal from the
order denying its motion to stay proceedings runs from December
31, 1986, is obvious if one merely considers the ramifications of
their contentions.

If the Bakers1 argument is correct, and it is

assumed, arguendo, that the December 31, 1986 order remained a
viable, final and appealable order, Western Surety should have
allowed its appeal to remain pending despite the fact that it was
mooted.

The Bakers1 argument would require a moot appeal to

remain pending until it is determined whether or not the new
order and judgment (which is the final and appealable order) will
be appealed from.

The problems inherent in such a procedure are

obvious and the continuation of an appeal that is moot is
completely inconsistent with the rules governing appellate
procedure. There cannot be two separate dates from which an
appeal runs.

There is only one final and appealable order and

all appeals must run from that date.

The final order in this

case was entered on April 7, 1987.
CONCLUSION
This court should affirm the trial court's order of April
7, 1987 granting relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). The
motion was brought and considered in accordance with the detailed
requirements of that rule and the court, in the furtherance of
justice, saw fit to grant such relief.

The ruling was based on

the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b) and was rendered in the
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exercise of the court's sound discretion, which should not be
overturned absent clear evidence of an abuse of that discretion.
Should this court find technical error in the trial
court's decision or find technical error with the trial court's
jurisdiction to entertain and grant the motion for relief under
Rule 60(b), the matter should be remanded to the trial court so
that any such technical deficiencies can be remedied and the Rule
60(b) order can be re-considered and re-entered in the trial
court's discretion.
In the alternative, if this court reverses the trial
court, Western Surety's cross-appeal should be reviewed and the
order denying the motion to stay proceedings should be reversed.
The proceedings below should have been stayed in the first
instance since the Bakers1 claims were included in the
interpleader action that had already been filed.

If the order

denying the stay is reversed and a stay of the proceedings below
is ordered, the Bakers will be able to participate in the
interpleader action as dictated by the equitable interpleader
rule, along with the other bond claimants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

,?£** day of October, 1987.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

N. BRAITHWAITE
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foregoing Brief of Respondent to be hand-delivered on this
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John D. Parken
PARKEN & KECK
9 Exchange Place
Suite 808
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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BONO OF MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER, SALESMAN OR CRUSHER
KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS: That we,

Craig

A.

Paoa-Dakis

Auto

Mart
of

<;>,»«# Ar.rtr»««
County of

2540

Salt

South Main

Lake

Street

Salt

rify

U t a ^ as P n n a p a | and

Lake

City

WESTERN SURETY COMPANY

a Surety Company qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as Surety, are jointly and severally held and
firmly bound to tfta people of the State of Utah to indemnify persona, firms and corporations for toss suffered by reason of
violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the total aggregate annual penal sum of T w e n t y T h o u s a n d a n d
Oollars ( $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 V . a s required by Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16(1). (1953. as amended), lawful money of the United States fo? ° '
the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors ana
assigns, jointly, severally and firmly by these presents. The total aggregate annual liability of this bond, regardless of the
number of claims, may not exceed < 20 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
THE CONOITION OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH. That.
WHEREAS, the above bounden principal has applied for a license to do business as a
Motor v«Hiri« D e a l e r
mtum the State of Utah, and that pursuant to the application, a license has
been or is about to be issued.
NOW. THEREFORE, if the above bounden principal shall obtain said license to do business as such
Mnfnr vmhifia n g a f g r
anrt shall well and truly observe and comply
with ail requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIOING FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE
'BUSINESS OF OEALJNG IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3. Title 41. Utah Code Ann. (1953. as amended).
and indemnify persons, firms and corporations in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-16(1). (1953, as amended), for toss
suif9r9^ by reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of said
Motor Vehicle Business Act or any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles, or rule or regulation respecting commerce in
motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority and shall pay judgments and costs adjudged against said
principal so as not to exceed a total aggregate annual liability of t 20 , 0 0 0 * 0 0
regardless of the number
of claims on this bond on account of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of said laws, rules or
regulations during the time of said license and all lawful renewals thereof, then the above obligation shall be null and void.
otherwise to remain in full force and effect. Said bounden principal shall also pay reasonable attorney's fees in cases
-successfully prosecuted to judgment.
The Surety herein reserves the right to withdraw as such surety except as to any liability already incurred or accrued
hereunder and may do so upon the giving of written notice of such withdrawal to the principal and to the Motor Vehicle
Business Administrator, provided., however, that no withdrawal shall be effective for any purpose until sixty days shall have
elapsed from and after the receipt of such notice by the said administrator, and further provided that no withdrawal shall in
anywise affect the liability of said surety arising out of fraud or fraudulent representations or for any violation or violations of
said laws, rules or regulation by the principal hereunder pnor to the expiration of such penod of sixty days, regardless of
whether or not the loss suffered has been reduced to judgment before the lapse of sixty days.
Signed and sealed this

*th

day of

February

19 JL6

CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS AUTO HA&T /
ATTEST

7

/

B

J

'

/

/

/*

Pnncspal

^WESTERN SURETY COMPANY
/ ^ . . «

Approved as to form l f ^ -- \
Office of me Utan Attc
MVBA-1 (ftov S-*4)

, - t u ?••••• - • • - : ; • • £ ; •

(\

\

\

M 0

\ " Y / T O f\(v\

.

w

urety

-C3 C cC,
Attorneyi^-Fact
**• ^ c : -

i<sjS :

** ~u~

John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DONN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS,
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICKGMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI,
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG,
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM,
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS,
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN,
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER,
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR.,
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS
dba AUTO MART, and JOHN and
JANE DOES 1 through 100,
Defendants.

A-2

COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER,
DECLARATORY RELIEF,
INJUNCTION AND INDEMNITY

civil N O ^

?$%<;

y Mil £ h<i<s=rMtti

Plaintiff, Western Surety Company (hereinafter "Western
Surety"), pursuant to Rules 22 and 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-1 et seq.f
alleges as a cause of action against the defendants as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Defendant Craig A, Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart

(hereinafter "Auto Mart") operated a motor vehicle dealership in
Salt Lake County, Utah at all times relevant herein.
2.

All other defendants (hereinafter "interpleader

defendants"), including John and Jane Does 1 through 100, have
purchased motor vehicles from defendant Auto Mart and/or sold
motor vehicles to defendant Auto Mart, or have otherwise entered
into transactions concerning motor vehicles with defendant Auto
Mart.
3.

Western Surety is a surety company qualified and

authorized to do business in the state of Utahf having its
principal place of business in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
4.

Western Surety issued Motor Vehicle Dealer Bond

#58161261 to defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart, said
bond having an effective date of February 4, 1986. A true and
accurate copy of said bond is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
5.

Said bond is issued pursuant to Section 41-3-16(1)

A-3
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! and is governed by Section 41-3-16(1) and the terras and

li
J conditions of the bond.

li
i;

6.

The total aggregate annual liability of said bond to

all persons making claims thereon is limited to $20,000.
I <

jI

7.

The interpleader defendants are potential or actual

claimants under the bond and have made claims or may be entitled
] to make claims against defendant Auto Mart and against Western
, Surety based on their motor vehicle transactions with defendant
!; Auto Mart.
,
8. By reason of the conflicting claims, actual or
i
potential, Western Surety is in great doubt as to which of the
'i
claimants is entitled to be paid and the amounts to be paid.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIOH
(Interpleader)
9.

Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by

!}
reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 8 set
i

forth above.
10.

The interpleader defendants represent conflicting

claims against Western Surety's bond an<3 Western Surety is in
great doubt as to which of the interpleader defendants is
entitled to be paid and the amounts to be paid.
11.

Western Surety is, therefore, exposed to multiple

liability and several lawsuits and is further exposed to numerous
additional potential lawsuits.

A-4
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12.

Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil

II
; Procedure, Western Surety is entitled to join all persons having
, claims against it as defendants in this actionf requiring them to
h
interplead their claims in the instant action and litigate the
amount of damages to which they are entitled.
I
i

13. Western Surety hereby represents that it will
deposit the $20,000 aggregate annual limit of the bond in

It
question into the registry of this Court, or otherwise deposit
\\

; the amount of $20,000 as ordered by the Courtf in order to

i|
satisfy its liability or potential liability to the interpleader
defendants, and alleges that it will thereby be entitled to an
||

order discharging it from any and all further liability on its

II bond

to any and all claimants.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunction)
14.

Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by

I reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 13
set forth above.
15.

Defendant Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. has filed a

! complaint with the Fifth Circuit Court, in and for Salt Lake
! County, Salt Lake Department, State of Utah, entitled Great Basin
i GMC Trucks, Inc. v. Western Surety Company, et al., Civil No.
86-57954CV, wherein defendant Great Basin GMC Trucks, Inc. seeks
!| recovery against Western Surety's bond, which is the subject of
ij

this action.

16.

Defendants George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker have

filed a complaint with the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entitled George H, Baker and
Delia A. Baker v. Western Surety Company, et a L , Civil No.
C86-7427, wherein defendants George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker
seek recovery against Western Surety's bond which is the subject
of this action.
17.

Defendant Safeway Credit Union One has filed a

complaint with the Fifth Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt
Lake County, Salt Lake Department, entitled Safeway Credit Union
One v. Western Surety Company, et al., Civil No. 86-CV-68912,
wherein defendant Safeway Credit Union One seeks recovery against
Western Surety's bond, which is the subject of this action.
18.

The complaints filed by defendant Great Basin GMC

Trucks, Inc., defendants George M. and Delia A. Baker, and
defendant Safeway Credit Union One, in the absence of the claims
or potential claims of the other interpleader defendants, subject
Western Surety to multiple conflicting claims and prejudice the
rights of the other claimants, and such actions should,
therefore, be enjoined.
19.

All interpleader defendants should be enjoined from

proceeding against Western Surety on its bond until all claimants
are before the Court in the instant action.

A-6
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

jl

(Discharge)

|

20.

Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by

j reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 19
set forth aJbove„

!

21.

Western Surety hereby represents that it will

», deposit the $20,000 aggregate annual limit of the bond in
M question into the registry of this Court, or otherwise deposit
i the amount of $20,000 as ordered by the Court, in order to
satisfy its liability or potential liability to the interpleader
*i

,j defendants, and alleges that it will thereby be entitled to an
tI

1

order discharging it from any and all further liability on its
bond to any and all claimants.

11

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Indemnification)
22.

Plaintiff realleges and hereby incorporates by

reference its allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 21
j set forth above.
23.

At or near the time the bond in question was issued

by Western Surety, defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis signed an
I indemnity agreement on behalf of himself and Craig A. Papa-Dafcis
dba Auto Mart, whereby he agreed to indemnify western Surety from
and against any liability, including costs and attorney's fees,
that Western Surety might sustain by reason of said bond.

A-7
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A true

and correct copy of the application for bond, which includes the
; written indemnity, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
i[

!l

24.

By reason of the written indemnity agreement,

; Western Surety is entitled to indemnity from defendant Craig A.
j Papa-Dakis for all expenditures incurred by Western Surety by
; reason of the claims made against this bond, including costs and
attorney f s fees incurred in undertaking the defense of claims
•I

; made against it, costs and attorney 1 s fees incurred in
undertaking the prosecution of this action, and any and all other
expenditures incurred by reason of said bond.
i|

WHEREFORE, plaintiff Western Surety Company prays for
i

judgment against defendants and further prays that the Court

li
adjudge as follows:
1. On the First Cause of Action against all
interpleader defendants as follows:
(a)

That each of the interpleader defendants be

required to interplead their claims and settle among themselves
their rights to the bond amount.
(b)

That the Court direct Western Surety where and to

whom to deposit its bond amount of $20,000, or any part thereof.
(c)

That Western Surety be discharged from all

|| liability on its bond, except to the person whom the Court shall
.adjudge entitled to custody of the bond amount of $20,000, or any
part thereof.

•|j

!i
i!
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(d)

That Western Surety recover its costs and

attorney's fees and that the same be deducted from the amount
that the Court directs to be paid as prayed for in subparagraphs
(b) and (c).
(e)

That the Court grant plaintiff its costs f

attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear
just.
2. On the Second Cause of Action against all
interpleader defendants as follows:
(a)

That each of the interpleader defendants be

restrained from instituting or prosecuting any action against
Western Surety to recover on the bond.
(b)

That the Court grant plaintiff its costs,

attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear
just.
3.

On the Third Cause of Action against all

interpleader defendants as follows:
(a)

That Western Surety be discharged from any and all

liability on its bond, except to the person whom the Court shall
adjudge entitled to custody of the bond amount of $20,000, or any
part thereof.
(b)

That the Court grant plaintiff its costs,

attorney's fees, and such other and further relief as may appear
just*
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4.

On the Fourth Cause of Action against defendant

Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart as follows:
(a)

For judgment in its favor and against defendant

Craig A, Papa-Dakis for any and all losses, costs, charges,
damages, counsel fees and expenses whatsoever and the sum of its
bond or any part thereof as the Court directs Western Surety to
pay, and all attorney f s fees and expenses incurred by Western
Surety in bringing this action and defending any other actions,
and for interest at the highest legal rate.
(b)

That the Court grant plaintiff such other and

further relief as may appear just.
DATED this

/£, ^~~ day of December, 1986.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

(MUn '/* w ^ i 6 ^ ^

JQHNN. BRAITHWAITE

Attorneys for Western Surety Company
Plaintiff's address:
101 South Phillips Avenue
Sioux Falls, SD 57192
8/86-743M.1

•• ^JS^f ^£&& ^ ^
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HIED »M CLERK'S OFFICE
SALT LAKE COUMH. UTAH

John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DONNr EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

Dec 17 4 07 PM '86
H 0 U 0 K HIHOLEY CJ.CRR
.
S.e.WSt.CCL'Rr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE H. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

ss.

John N. Braithwaite, being first duly sworn, upon oath,
deposes and says that:
1.

I am the attorney of record for Western Surety

Company in the above entitled action.
2.

On or about the 9th day of December, 1986, I, on

behalf of Western Surety Company, filed a motion to stay this
action based upon the ground that Western Surety Company intended

A-ll

Q87

to file an interpleader action pursuant to Rule 22 of the Dtah
Rules of Civil Proceduref which interpleader action would include
the claim brought against Western Surety Company in this lawsuit.
3. A complaint for interpleader has now been filed in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, Civil No. C86-9295.

A true and correct copy of

said complaint for interpleader is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A."
4.

Said complaint for interpleader includes George M.

Baker and Delia A. Baker as defendants and thereby includes the
claim brought against Western Surety in this lawsuit.
DATED this

/ 7 ^ day of

Dzte/rth^

, 1986.

HANSON, D0NN, EPPERSON & SMITH

"' ^tfbtlfc

JOHN N* BRAITHWAITE

Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s

1*7

day of

NOTARY gGBLlC
^
Residing""at
Sou.mM-h-0. UhjdL

My Commission E x p i r e s :
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
/~?^

of the foregoing to be hand-delivered this

Dea*J*y*

day of

j

1986, to:

|

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, OT 84101

j
i
!

and I further certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, this
(A*)
r_&Z£zJj±

/"?

day

, 1986, to:

Craig A. Papa-Dakis
1630 South Main
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
J/rfor

f t

Mitn&C/rWhfc

8/86-600D.11

A _ 1 3

i

^

~ «

i FILM':?-n

4 M *

i « n

JAH 16

; John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
| HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

•.-•••'

3 53 PH '81
—"v

&»%%ga-0fitteM>fiJ

i A Professional Corporation
! 650 Clark Learning Office Center
I 175 South West Temple, Suite 650
\ Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

2L ; : o T > •:.--*••*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI/.

ISTRICT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
VS,

ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS,
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICKGMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI,
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG,
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM,
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS,
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN,
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER,
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR.,
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS
dba AUTO MART, JOHN and JANE
DOES 1 through 100, and UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendants.
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MOTION TO ENJOIN
EXECUTION AND
DETERMINE PRIORITY
TO BOND FUNDS

Civil No. C86-9295

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Western Surety Company hereby moves the above entitled
Court for an injunction, enjoining defendants George M. and Delia
!i

!

A. Baker from executing upon the judgment obtained against
!
.' Western Surety Company in the action styled George M. Baker and

!
i
i

:

i

:l

'• Delia A, Baker v. Western Surety Company; Craig A, Papa-Dakis, et j
i al.. Civil No. C86-7427, and requiring defendants George M. and Delia
i|
;; A. Baker to interplead their claim to the bond funds in the
instant action.
Western Surety Company further moves this Court to
determine priority to the bond funds held by the Court pursuant

li
, to this action for interpleader.
ij

DATED this

/Cr-

day of January, 1987.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

i

/-tnr-

JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
i

I hor^hy certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be HAND DELIVERED this

/fcT^

day of

, 1987, to the following:

j

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, DT 84101

<Z^^A}%^MA
and 1 further certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to
each of the named party defendants in this action on the
day of

v&nuarty

/ U^

• 1 98 ?.

•f

r&rf^Vfrngy*

9/8€-74JM.8

COU&TV pf SALT LAKE ) * *
I. T^« UWOERSiC^CD, CLERK 01= THE DISTRICT
r c ^ R T dP BM.T LA:CE COUNTY, UTAH, CO HE3SBV
* C ?-ii^! \TK,<\ THE AN'KSXED AND FCnC^ClNG 13
I •^\'--kWD FULL COPY C? AW C ^ S ^ L CCCi>
V*-."rtESS MY HAND > ^ D S E M i C? ^AlD COURT
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DEPUTE

1

THE COURT:

2

That should be resolved by Judge

Wilkinson now# not by me.

*

MR. BRAITHWAITE:

The motion against Western

4

Surety

*

31-4-18, only upon the bond.

6

I

upon the bond liability, pursuant to the statute,

THE COURT:

That question I think, Mr. Braithwait^

you have got to approach with Judge Wilkinson.
8

law suit.

He tried that case.

That's hi. s

You're asking me now to

* J make a ruling about whether that judgment can be executed
10

could be satisfied and that is not in this case.

11

-ly shouldn't be a part of this case.

It proper4

That should be a part}

'* | of the case with Judge Wilkinson;so I frankly think that to
13

I the extent—well, I frankly think the order was wrongfully

,4

issued and I am

15

order.

16

J

going to dissolve the temporary restraining

Now, that does not make

any ruling and not intended

17

to be a ruling as to

18

priority against this fund;but I am not going to, in this

19

whether or not the Baker judgment has

J action, stay the execution of that judgment and if they wantj

20

to go try and execute anyplace they want to, such defenses

21

as may be available to those executions can be raised;but

22

they'll have to be raised in that case.

**
24

Now, if they execute against the fund here, that wili
clearly raise the question of the priority that we're driving

** I at here.

But everybody is entitled to be heard on that, not

just the people who are here today.

So that in the event tq

execution is made as aginst the County Attorney's Office

an objection could or should be ! filed,

'

And as to that,)

2

based upon the fact that that's a priority, that shouldn't

* I

be qx -inted ; In, wku ch event, we,l1 ] notice it up or somebody
will notice it up and we!11 hear that issue totally and

*
6

completely, with everyone who "has been named in uie action
I

to receive notice, because everybody's entitled to that.

7

But In so far aa what is going on in that other case over

8

there, J, ami not qoiruj to corit Inue the temporary t estra.Ln Lngj

9

order and it's hereby dissolved.

10

MR. BRAITHJCVITE:

Well, Your Honor, then our Motiop\

'" i

to Enjoin Execiirmri I*IJM uti,'in n mirnrieii with «i Mot-ion LO

11

Determine Priority.

13

I

THE COURT:
case here today.

15

Not going to determine priority xn thils
You haven*t even c^ot all the parties here

and you don't even have notice to all the parties or servicja

16

h i 1 f I m pa i !" 1 e s llhna ve r ece I, i/ecl

MR. BRAITHWAITE:

17

notice, Your Honor.

18

are eight of the parties that have not yet been served.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

And Your Honor is quite correct, there)

I think aa tu M R questi on of priority)

everybody who is in this action is entitled to be heard and)
the action I have just taken is not going to allow Mr.
Parken's cl Lents to g< :> < )i it a.
fund

latch, on to that $20,000

If they do that, you can raise the objection and filfc

the very Tfcind of thing that we 1 re talking about

A petition

iio determine nr motion to determine priorities In this case
I will,

point, take that under advisement, but every-

-body is entitled to be heard;so everybody is entitled to bi
A - l ft

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

noticed as to that issue.

That's still up in Hie

air and going to stay up in the air until we have everybody!
here who has an interest and we'll hear it.

But as to the

staying of the judgment and the Baker vesus Western Surety
Company case, I dpn't
to stay that.

think that I have any jurisdiction

Judge Wilkinson is the judge who heard it an£

he was asked to stay it and he refused to do it.

If you

want to go back and repetition him on that, you may.

But

I think until that's done, I haven't got any right to step
in and tell them they can't do that.

To protect the fund,

if they execute against it and I haven't said they can't do!

12

that and I haven't said I am going to allow them to get the|

13

fund either.

14

they can execute,on that judgment and you're going to have

15

to get your relief from the Supreme Court or Judge Wilkinsoh.

16

It's perfectly clear that it's improper for me to substitute

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I am going to allow them whatever they think

my judgment for his.
MR. BRAITHWAITE:

Under Your Honor's ruling,however,

I think the case of Surety Company of the Pacific versus
Piver is exadtly the situation we have here.

This court

does have the authority to enjoin the execution outside of
the interpleader action.
THE COURT:

Well, I think may be I have, but I

don't think I am going to tell that to Judge Wilkinson what)
you've already asktd him to do and already turned it down.
That would reverse him.

I don't have any jurisdiction by

41

I have jurisdiction over in this case

The question

as to the effectiveness and extent of the judgment granted
in the Baker case is real ly •Judge Wilkinson's, it isn't min^
If I substituted ray judgment for him, I would clearly be
wrong

cnat will be the

order.

You may prepare it,

M r . Paken.
MR. PARKEN:
MR. LEWI

Appreciate it, Your Honor.
Corn 1x1 w€i

it:11 A date for a hearing,

Your Honor?
THE COURT:
yet
date.

You haven't got service on everybody
a i i, :::! ta] k tc • Kathy about set I: i i i

My Law and Motion comes up every Friday.

If we're

going to have an extended hearing, we'll need a special
setting.

We can give that to you as soon as you know you

have got everybody in the action you think you can get into
the act ::1 on

If you wi 1 1 just • contact Kathy,we*

date out.

(WHEREUPON

this hearing w a s concluded.)
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LED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County, Utah

mi

John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

mr
Deputy CterK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

'fek

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs,

SL\3

Y\\a 313

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants.

Civil No. C86-7427
The Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson

The Motion of Western Surety Company For Relief From
Judgment or, in the alternative, To Limit Execution to the
Interpleaded Funds came on regularly for hearing before this
Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, on Friday,
February 13, 1987, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Western Surety
Company appearing by and through its counsel, John N.
Braithwaite, plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel,
John D. Parken, the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file
A-21
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t£.\

herein, having reviewed the memoranda supporting and opposing
said mo I ion, havinq heard

mul considered the arguments and the

representations of counsel, being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HBRBBf ORDERED that the motion of Western Surety
Company for relief from judgment is granted pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of '",ivil Pr icetlu1 e tor Lht ieasun that
the Order and Summary Judgment previously signed and entered by
this Court on December 31, 1986 was entered by mistake and is
incorrect, an-i £m

the r, eas.Mi that said Order and Summary

Judgment is otherwise void.

Relief from judgment

granted and the Order and Summar

;

: .•*<

.; accordingly
.- .. -•

t:

rd is

mod i f led ami corrected pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, so as to be entered in its entirety as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Western Surety Company's
motion to stay proceedings is denied; and J i: r>« hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that no genuine dispute exists as to any
fact material to the determination of plaintiffs1 motion for
summary judgment and plaintiffs ace granted summary judgment
against Western Surety Company's bond in the amount of
$15,800,14, together with interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from and after Decenibei' 1,1

1986,- and together

with plaintiffs1 costs incurred in this action, but with each

A-22
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party to bear their own counsel fees, and it is is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment awarded to the
plaintiffs is against the bond only, that the plaintiffs are only
entitled to relief against the bond funds, which funds are
deposited in the registry of the Court in the interpleader
action, and that the plaintiffs' relief against the bond funds is
limited as determined by the Court in the interpleader action
filed on December 16, 1986, Civil No. C86-9295; and it is hereby
FURTHER ORDERED that Western Surety Company's liability
is limited to the bond*

DATED this

7

day of

^ ^ - ^

, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H.D.XONH.NOUEV
he Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

aintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that- I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to be hand delivered this
Hot

day of

/tf/Jr^L

, 1987, to the following:

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, OT 84101

(LL //.
9/86-600D.*,
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cRK Gf THE CiRCuil CGUFJ
S A 7 LAKE GEPARTKcNT

1

RICHARD C. CAHOON -#A535

2

MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON

3

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

4

68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR

5

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

6

TELEPHONE: (801)521-3800

STATE OF UTAH
County
*y of Salt
saft La«e
Lara
)s*^.\
ttlSJl
/-?{
I, the undars.g-'--- Clerk of ^ P ^ a ^ S 6 0 ^ T ^ * i ' o-^
Utah,i, Salt Laka County, Salt Ukfc D | b t | ^ i f c F < # t e W
certify tr*t toe annexed and forggi
copy of an original document on file
oterk.
WHneai any hand and seal of said Court This
^3
day of
/CcC0«,^
frQ
19
PAUL L VANCE, Clerk
By
Deputy

7
8
9

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

10
11
12

GREAT BASIN GMC TRUCKS, INC.
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff

13
14
15
16

Civil No. 86-57954CV

vs.
CRAIG A. PAPADAKIS d/b/a
AUTO MART and WESTERN
SURETY COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation,

17

Defendant.

18
19
20

For cause of action, Plaintiff complains and alleges against
Defendant as follows:
Count I

21
22

1.

The amount in controversy herein is less than $10,000

23
24
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1

exclusive of cost of court.

2

2.

The Defendant on June 28, 1986 fraudulently with an

3

intent to defraud Plaintiff, issued a check for $8511.00 and took

4

possession of a 1985 Chevrolet truck/ vehicle identification

5

number 1GCEK14HIFF364925.

6 I

3.

Defendant owes the sum of $8,511.00 for a 1985 Chev-

' I i. o let truck, as shown on the statement attached hereto as Exhibit
°

jj "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

9

4.

The Plaintiff's agreement for purchase of this auto-

10

mobile provides for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees,

11

costs of collection and interest at the rate of 18% per annum,

12

July, 28, 1986, unt i1 paid.

13

5.

The Defendant has issued a "bad check", a copy of which

14

is attached hereto as Exhibit "B", thus failing to pay the usm

15

owed to Plaintiff.

16

as provided

17

amended.

18

21
22

in Section 7-15-2 Utah Code Annotated

6.
c

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations
paragraphs 1-5 o

Count I as if fully set forth

herein.
7.

The Defendant Western Surety Company

23
24

1953, as

Count II

19
20

Plaintiff has give Defendant written notice

2
A-26

issued a bond

pursuant to Section 41-3-16 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.
8.

The Plaintiff pursuant to Section 41-3-16(a) has filed a

claim in writing with the State Administrator.
9.

The Plaintiff has not been paid the sum of $8511.00 by

either of the defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands Judgment against the Defendant
Craig A. Papadakis as follows on Count I:
1.

For the sum of $8511.00.

2.

Reasonable Attorney Fees.

3.

Interest and costs.

4.

Such other and further relief as the Court deems just

and equitable.
On Count II against defendant Western Surety Company:
1.

For the sum of $8511.00.

2.

Interest and costs.

3.

Such other and further relief as the court deems just

and equitable.
DATED this

/y

day of September, 1986.

'^^K^
TCrCHARD C. CAHOON
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's Address:
A-27
2800 South 300 West
P.O. Box 15469
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115

r v
I, the u n d & r ^ '
' v' ^ Circuit Cou t, 9fc*» e '
Utah, Salt Laka C o ^ w ;.V- i \ke Capartmon <jo '^raby
certify the; the anr**^j r:>; ^xjoing is a t*ie :-nci ^5J
copy of an origin*! documon; on file in my office as sucr
dork.
Wine* my hand a«d s'*" c-r said Court This
S. •

«*y of
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PAUL L VANCE, Clerk

%- _ _ _

^

-»:KK Cf
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Oepuiv

Mark A. Wolfert - 4171
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 26786
Salt Lake City, UT 84126-0786
Telephone: (801) 972-0307
3N VWv iTRClMT COURT K')P SAL/I1 LAKE <T)Urn
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, ST^TE OF UTAH
SAFEWAY CREDIT UNION ONE
formerly known as Safeway
Credit Union,
Plaintiff,
C O M

P

•

A

> H

T

-vsROBERT OCKEY, CAROL OCKEY also
known as Carol Fossat, and
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS dba Craig
A, Papa-Dakis Auto Mart,
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

Civil Nc

^LZ^hllZJ}X/

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Safeway Credit Union formerly known as
Safeway Credit Union, alleges and complains of the Defendants as
follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff is a credit union authorized to and doing
business In Salt Lake County, Utah.
2. Defendants RobeiL Cekey and Carol Ockey also known
as Carol Fossat are residents of Salt L4ke county, Utah,
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3. Defendant
Craig
A. Papa-Dakis
dba
Craig
A.
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart is a resident of and doing business in Salt
Lake County, Utah.
4. Defendant Western Surety Company is a surety company
qualified and authorized to do business in the State of Utah as a
surety.
5. The amount in controversy, exclusive of costs and
interest, is less than $10,000.00.
6. This cause of action arose in Salt Lake County,
Utah.
7. On or about September 5, 1985, Defendants Robert and
Carol Ockey executed and delivered to Plaintiff a Safeway Credit
Union Paymaster Promissory Note and Loan Agreement, a copy of
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as
Exhibit "A.n
8. On or about September 5, 1985, said Defendants also
executed a security agreement and financing statement whereby they
pledged a 1982 Toyota Pickup Truck to the Plaintiff as collateral
for the loan in Exhibit "A."
A true and correct copy of the
security agreement and financing statement is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B.w
9. Plaintiff has a perfected first lien security
interest in the 1982 Toyota Pickup Truck by way of the first lien
notation on the Utah Certificate of Title, the original being in
the hands of the Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of said title
is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit
"C."
10. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the note in
Exhibit "A," Defendants Robert and Carol Ockey were to make
regular monthly payments to Plaintiff, which they have failed to
A-29
- 2 -

do; said Defendants are therefore in default under the terms and
conditions of the agreements in Exhibits "A" and "B."
11. Defendants owe to Plaintiff and Plaintiff is
entitled to recover from Defendants the amount of $4585.14 plus
interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum from a~* :
after August 22, 1986.
Plaintiff is also ent i tied to recover a reasonable
attorneys fee from the Defendants pursuant to the agreement in
Exhibit "A."
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
13. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1
through 12 of the First Cause of Action.
14. Subsequent to Defendants Ockeysf loan agreement
with Plaintiff in September, 1985, and subsequent to Defendant
fcraig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart's bond dated
February 4, 1986, Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A.
pPapa-Dakis Auto Mart came into possession of the 1982 Toyota
pickup Truck.
15. Defendants Ockeys had surrendered the vehicle to
Defendant Craig A, Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart
for the purpose of trading it in on a new vehicle.
16. Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis
dba Craig A.
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart was to tender the amount due on the
Defendants Ockeys1 obligation with the Plaintiff to Plaintiff
credit union, whi ch said Defendant has failed to do.
J 7 Despite notice and demand
to the contrary,
Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A. Papa-Dakis Auto Mart
has failed and refused to return the vehicle to Plaintiff or
Defendants Ockeys, and has also failed to pay to Plaintiff the
amount of the underlying obligation.
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18. Defendant Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Craig A.
Papa-Dakis Auto Mart has also violated provisions of Title 41
regarding the proper registration of vehicles with the Utah
Department of Motor Vehicles.
19. By virtue of said Defendant's conversion and
violation of Title 41, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of
$4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum from and after August 22, 1986 until paid, which amounts
Plaintiff is entitled to collect from said Defendant.
20. Plaintiff
attorney's fee.

is

also

entitled

to

a

reasonable

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1
through 2 of the First and Second Causes of Action.
22. On or about February 4, 1986, Defendant Western
Surety Company executed and filed its bond of Motor Vehicle
Dealer, Salesman or Crusher, Bond #58161261, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as Exhibit "D.w
23. Said bond proports to be executed and filed
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §41-3-16(1), (1953, as amended),
promising to indemnify persons, firms c*nd corporations for loss
suffered in the total aggregate annual penal sum of $20,000.00.
24. Said bond also binds the said Defendant to pay
reasonable attorney's fees in cases that are successfully
prosecuted to judgment.
25. Pursuant to §41-3-16(1) of the Utah Code, Plaintiff
filed a written claim with the administrator within one year after
this cause of action arose, a true and correct copy of which claim
is attached hereto as Exhibit "E."
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26. Having not received an acceptable response to that
claim, Plaintiff Is filing this action against Defendant Western
Surety Company within two (2) years after the claim was filed, as
required by said title, chapter and section.
27. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of its
damages from the Defendant on Defendant's bond in the amount of
$4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum from and after August 22, 1986, uhtil the date paid, and its
reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for j udgmen 1: aga i ns t the
I)e£enda
as follows:
For damages against the Defendant s Robert and Carol
Ockey a ] s< known as Carol Fossat in the amount of $4585.1 4 plus
interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum from
August 2?- 1QR6, until the date paid on Plaintiff's First Cause of
Action;
2. For damages
against
the Defendant Craig
A.
Papa-Dakis dba Craig fl Papa-Dakis Auto Mart i n the amount of
$4585•14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum from August 22, 1986, until the date paid on Plaintiff's
Second Cause of Action;
3. For damages against Defendant Western Surety Company
in the amount of $4585.14 plus interest at the rate of fourteen
percent (14%) per annum from August 22, 1986, until the date paid
on Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action;
4. For reasonable attorneys ^ees;
5# p o r costs of court; and

- 5 A-32

6.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and

equitable.
DATED t h

September, 1986.
i.3t<day of BRUCE
L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES

y
J *
MARK Aj. WOLFERT
Attorneys for Plain/tiff
1600 West 2200 South, Suite 102
P.O. Box 26786
Salt Lake City, UT 84126-0786
Plaintiff's address:
3226 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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Salt Lake C i t y . U t a h

DEC 2 9 1986
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

H. Dixon Hindjey. Clerk 3 i d Oist. Court

By

K- O^mbnas?
D<»OII*

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

pEPOSIT OF BOND AMOUNT
INTO REGISTRY OF COURT
AND ORDER

vs.
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS,
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICKGMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI,
LISA KTT.T.OUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG,
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM,
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS,
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN,
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER,
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR.,
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS
dba AUTO MART, and JOHN and
JANE DOES 1 through 100,
Defendants.
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Civil NO.

Cgt-92?£

Hon. Richard H. Moffat

Western Surety Company hereby deposits the $20,000
aggregate annual limit of its bond, which is the subject of this
action, into the registry of the above-entitled court, and
requests that the sum deposited be held in an interest-bearing
account*
DATED this

29—

day of

D,s#j»Lr*

, 1986.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

JpHN N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorney for Western Surety
Company

-2-

!l

ORDER

f

Western Surety Company, having deposited the $20,000

' aggregate annual limit of its bond into the registry of the
court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the deposit of the $20,000
bond amount by Western Surety Company be held in an interest
bearing account until further order of this court.
DATED this 3ff

day of {fj/&3buJ[u^"/

1986.

BY__TflE^p«JRT:

MOPPAT

irt Judge

13/86-743.1
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J*!** •* B**ltbv«it*>, Bar No. 4 544
mAMSom, Dornm, BPPBRSON & SMITH

A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

NoriC£

Plaintiff,
AMENDED

vs.

NOTICE OF HEARING
ROBERT BENSON, WAYNE THOMAS,
TIMOTHY L. RYAN, ALLRED BUICKGMC TRUCKS, UTAH DRIV-UR-SELF
SYSTEM, INC., JOHN R. SZYMANSKI,
LISA KILLOUGH, SAFEWAY CREDIT
UNION ONE, GREAT BASIN GMC
TRUCKS, INC., ROBERT and CAROL
OCKEY, LYLE E. KOESTEL, DEREK and
DEANNA M. GENT, GEORGE M. and
DELLA A. BAKER, AMERICA FIRST
CREDIT UNION, ROBERT S. HARTUNG,
CD.P. CREDIT ASSOCIATION, TRUDY
L. CLEGG, REV. JONG SOO HAM,
LARRY E. MAYCOCK, FRUTOS and
FRANCES SALAZ, RANDY A. DOWNS,
NEAL PAGE, CINDY and LINDA JENSEN,
MICHAEL F. OLSEN, IKE SPENCER,
RICHARD D. HEINZ, KHAMBONG
PHETCHAMPHONE, SAM J. IRA, SR.,
KEN GARFF IMPORTS-GARFF
ENTERPRISES, INC., ALLEN D. and
CELIA D. CAMPBELL, RAY BATTISON
dba KLEEN KAR SALES, PETE
KARAPANOS, CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS
dba AUTO MART, JOHN and JANE
DOES 1 through 100, and UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendants.
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Civil No. C86-9295

Judge Richard H. Moffat

tO TH8 ABOVK NAMED PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the hearing on plaintiff's
MOTION TO ENJOIN EXECUTION AND DETERMINE PRIORITY TO BOND FUNDS,
previously scheduled for Friday, the 30th day of January, 1987,
at the hour of 9:00 a.m., has been continued to and will be heard
on Thursday, the 5th day of February, at 9:30 a.m., and will be
heard in conjunction with an Order To Show Cause why the
temporary restraining order issued in this matter should not
remain in effect.

Both matters will be heard before the

Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge, 451 South 200
East, Third Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
DATED this 27th day of January, 1987.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

torney for Plaintiff
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CBRTIPICATB OP SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy

*7

of the foregoing to be HAND DELIVERED this
"^JOnuar

ifcl

day of

., 1987, to the followingt

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, DT 84101

^y\^

\
\s

and I further certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to
each of the named party defendants in this action on the
day of

\Jsf\acrLA
^

f

o?7

1987.

9/86-743M.17
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STATE OF UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

RMAN H. BANGERTER
Gov«mor

^ „ ^—

„^*

«

.

HAROLD C. YANCEY
Insurance Commissioner

160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45803

Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Phone: (801) 530-6400

CERTIFIED MAIL
January

27, 1987

Western Surety Company
101 South Phillips
Avenue
Sioux Falls,
SD 57192
Attention:
RE:
Dear Mr.

Joe Patrick
Our File

Kirby,

President

No. 22101

Kirby:

On January 13, 1987 the above referred
to file
was opened
pursuant
to a complaint
filed
with
the Department
alleging
that
Western
Surety has failed
to satisfy
an existing
judgment entered
in the
Third District
Court in the State of Utah, Salt Lake County
(Civil
No. C86-7427).
The complaint
was forwarded
to Western
Surety
Company on or about January 16, 1987 and we are awaiting
the
company's response.
However, an additional
matter has come to the
attention
of the Commissioner which causes this correspondence
to
be forwarded
to you.
The judgment at issue in this matter was entered
on December 30,
1986.
It was the understanding
of counsel
for the plaintiff
in
those proceedings
that Western Surety
would not voluntarily
pay
the judgment.
While we understand
that Western Surety
has the
right
of appeal,
it was also
the understanding
of
plaintiff's
counsel
that Western Surety
would not appeal.
Accordingly,
if
that is the fact,
then Western Surety
is obliged
to satisfy
the
judgment.
The Commissioner
views this matter with much concern.
Because of
the position
taken by Western Surety,
through its counsel
in Salt
Lake City,
plaintiff
has been forced
to seek the enforcement
and
satisfaction
of the judgment
through
a massive
garnishment
of
Western Surety
Company agents doing business
in this state.
The
garnishment
has been issued
to approximately
twenty
(20)
agents
and will
continue
until
the judgment
is satisfied.
We have
received
complaints
from agents,
who were not parties
to the
lawsuit,
concerning
the garnishment
of their trust account
funds.
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-2It is the position
of the Commissioner
that Western Surety
must
satisfy
the judgment and not allow the continued
garnishment
of
its agents in this state.
We view the matter
of the
outstanding
garnishment
procedures
to be totally
xxnnecessairy.
Furthermore,
Utah insureds
may be placed
in a perilous
position
under
the
garnishment
of funds intended as premium for
coverage.
Under
the
Utah
Insurance
Code,
Section
31A-2-308(ll),
the
Commissioner
may revoke
the Certificate
of Authority
of
any
licensee
whose methods and practices
he finds would endanger
the
legitimate
interest
of customers and the public.
In light
of that
provision,
the conduct of Western Surety in failing
to satisfy
an
outstanding
judgment would, in the opinion
of the
Commissioner,
place
the Certificate
of Authority
of the company in jeopardy
in
this state.
The Commissioner cannot find good cause, under
these
facts,
for Western Surety to allow a garnishment
of its
agents,
which may jeopardize
policyholders
as well
as the
legitimate
interests
of the public.
Subject
to Western Surety's
right
of
appeal
of
the
judgment
that
is
currently
outstanding,
the
Commissioner
demands that Western Surety
honor the judgment
and
satisfy
it in full.
Should the company decide
not to appeal
the
judgment
and not satisfy
it,
the Commissioner will
file
a Notice
of Hearing and Order to Show Cause and consider
all
appropriate
penalties
in enforcement of the Insurance
Code.
Your
cooperation
in
attendance
to
this
matter
is
greatly
appreciated.
The Commissioner
expects
the written
response
of
Western
Surety
within
ten
(10)
days
of
receipt
of
this
correspondence.
Sincerely,
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU
Insurance
Commissioner

Kendall R.
Surfass
Market Conduct Staff
KRS:lm
1105L
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Counsel

LAW O F F I C E S

HJLKSOX, D U X N , E P P E R S O N - &

SMITH

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
© S O CLARK LEAMING OFFICE CENTER
T!M OALTON OUNN
OAVIO H EPPERSON
LOWELL V SMITH
R O B E R T R WALLACE
PAUL M MATTHEWS
SCOTT W C H R I S T E N S E N
TERRY M PLANT
CLIFFORD C ROSS
THEODORE E. KANELL
T J TSAKALOS
CURTIS J DRAKE
ANNE 3 W E N S E N
J O H N N aRAiTHWAlTE
GORDON K J E N S E N
MARK OALTON OUNN

ITS S O U T H W E S T T E M P L E

S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H a^ioi
TELEPHONE (SOD 3 6 3 - 7 6 1 1

February 6, 1987

STEWART S STEWART
STEWART STEWART & ALEXANOER
STEWART ALEXANOER S 3 U 0 G E
STEWART STEWART S CANNON
STEWART CANNON S HANSON
HANSON & 3AL0WIN
HANSON BRANDT SWAOSWORTH
HANSON WAOSWORTH S RUSSON
HANSON RUSSON HANSON SL OUNN
HANSON R U S S O N & O U N N
REX J HANSON
UQiM9dO>

STATE OP OTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, OT 84145
Attn:
RE:

Harold C. Yancey, Insurance Commissioner
Kendall R. Surfass

Bond No. 58161261 - Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart
Insurance Dept. File No. 22101

Gentlemen:
This letter will serve to respond to your correspondence
of January 27, 1987. We sincerely hope that some of the concerns
set forth in that letter have been laid to rest by your receipt
of our letter dated January 28, 1987. We will now expand upon
the matters discussed in our previous letter and address
specifically the concerns set forth in your most recent letter.
As you are now aware, this matter concerns a motor
vehicle dealer's bond issued to Craig A. Papa-Dakis dba Auto Mart
on February 4, 1986. During the Fall of 1986, three separate
lawsuits were filed against the principal and Western Surety
Company, one of which was filed by George M. and Delia A. Baker.
With the filing of the third lawsuit, it became apparent that the
claims might exceed the $20,000 bond limit. Accordingly, Western
Surety Company began taking steps to file an interpleader action,
such that all claimants could be heard and have an opportunity to
participate in any bond distribution. Opon contacting the Motor
Vehicle Department, we learned that approximately 35 claims had
been filed against the principal during 1986. Prior to the
filing of this interpleader action, the Baker's counsel, John
Parken, was informed of the existence of numerous claims and the
necessity of an interpleader action. Despite such knowledge, the
Bakers continued to prosecute their action toward judgment.
Prior to the entry of judgment in favor of the Bakers,
and prior to any hearing on the matter, Western Surety Company
filed its complaint for interpleader, naming approximately 35
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Mr. Harold Yancey
Mr. Kendall Surfass
State of Otah Insurance Dept.
February 6, 1987
Page 2
claimants. The 35 named claimants were those who had filed a
claim with the Department of Motor Vehicles as required by law.
These 35 claimants included George and Delia Baker, along with
the other two claimants that had previously filed suit.
Prior to the hearing on the Bakerfs motion for summary
judgment, Western Surety filed a motion to stay the proceedings
based upon the filing of the interpleader and the inclusion of
the Bakers in that action. The motion to stay proceedings was
denied and the Bakers1 motion for summary judgment was granted.
At that pointf Western Surety believed that the judgment entered
would be satisfied within the interpleader action against the
bond funds held under the interpleader jurisdiction. It became
apparent, however, that the Bakers did not wish to enter the
interpleader action to satisfy their judgment, but instead
desired to execute upon that judgment separate and apart from the
interpleader and the bond funds, in an effort to recover the
entirety of their judgment in the amount of $15,800.14.
In mid-January, the Bakers attempted to satisfy their
judgment by instituting garnishment proceedings and serving
numerous agents throughout the state with writs of garnishment.
At this pointf it became necessary to obtain an order temporarily
restraining such execution, pending a ruling by the judge in the
interpleader action concerning such garnishment procedures. This
hearing was held on February 5, 1987. At this hearing, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Third District Court Judge, ruled
that he could not restrain execution upon the judgment outside of
the interpleader action because of his limited jurisdiction,
which, by his ruling, is over the interpleader action only and
the $20,000 bond amount deposited therein. Judge Moffat
indicated that execution outside of the interpleader action must
be limited or otherwise ruled upon by the judge handling the
matter in the Baker action.
The problem that has developed at this point is that the
Bakers have obtained a judgment against the bond and apparently
feel that, by reason of the judgment, they have priority to the
$20,000. The interpleader action was filed before such judgment
was obtained, however. Western Surety Company does not dispute
the fact that the Bakers are entitled to participate in the
interpleader action and receive whatever monies they are entitled
to therein. It is simply the position of Western Surety that
satisfaction of the judgment must be within the interpleader
action, out of the bond funds that are the subject of that
action.
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Mr* Harold Yancey
Mr* Kendall Surfass
State of Utah Insurance Dept.
February 6, 1987
Page 3
With the above described posture of this matter, it is
apparent that a ruling must be made at some point limiting
execution upon the Bakers1 judgment to the interpleaded bond
funds. Perhaps the isolated summary judgment granted in favor of
the Bakers should not have been considered with the interpleader
already established. Accordingly, Western Surety Company has
appealed the denial of its motion to stay proceedings. It should
be noted at this point that it has never been represented to
plaintiffs1 counsel that Western Surety would not appeal.
Rather, representations were simply made that Western Surety
Company would not appeal plaintiffs' claim on the merits.
Plaintiffs' claim is not being disputed on the merits. It is
merely Western Surety Company's position with this appeal that
plaintiffs* claim should have been considered within the
interpleader action and satisfied therein, rather than considered
in isolation. If the plaintiffs' claim had been considered in
the interpleader action, the attempts to satisfy the judgment
outside of the interpleader action would not occur.
With the appeal of the denial of Western Surety
Company's motion to stay proceedings pendingf execution upon the
judgment subsequently rendered will be stayed pending the appeal.
It remains Western Surety Company's positionr however, that the
Bakers may participate in the interpleader action and satisfy
their judgment therein despite the pendency of the appeal.
Western Surety Company is not unwilling to satisfy the judgment
entered against it and the plaintiffs have not been forced to
seek the enforcement and satisfaction of their judgment through
garnishment proceedings. The plaintiffs have full right and are
entitled to satisfy their judgment within the interpleader
action. The plaintiffs are not entitledf however, to satisfy
that judgment outside of the interpleader actionf as such would
place a risk of double liability upon Western Surety Company
because the $20,000 bond amount is held by the Court and under
the interpleader court's jurisdiction.
It is truly unfortunate that this matter has come to
rest in its current posture. It has not been Western Surety's
intent to delay or hinder the Bakers in seeking satisfaction of
their judgment. Rather, Western Surety has admitted its
liability on the $20,000 bond and tendered the same into the
Court with interpleader jurisdiction. Satisfaction of judgments
obtained following the filing of that interpleader must be made
within the interpleader action.
We hope that this letter will provide you with the
information necessary to understand the posture of these claims.

Mr^ Harolcj

Yancey
Mr. Kendall Surfass
State of Utah Insurance Dept.
February 6, 1987
Page 4
If you have any questions or concerns at all about this matter,
please feel free to contact the undersigned counsel for Western
Surety Company•

Very truly yoursf
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
i

^JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorneys for Western Surety Co.
JNB/dn
cc: Kevin Bonnett
Western Surety Company
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STATE OF UTAH
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT

ORMAN H. BANGERTER

1 7 JLV^*2T

HAROLD C. YANCEY

Governor

Insurance Commissioner

160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45803
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Phone: (801)530-6400

February

12,

1987

Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith
650 Clark Learning Office
Center
115 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attention:
RE:
Dear Mr.

John N.
Our File

Braithwaite
No.

22101

Braithwaite:

I am in receipt
of your February 6, 1987 hand-delivered
letter
in
response
to the Baker complaint.
We agree
that
it
is
truly
unfortunate
that
this
matter
has come to rest
in its
current
posture.
We also believe
that it is not Western Surety's
intent
to delay
or hinder
the Bakers
in seeking
satisfaction
of
the
judgment,
but further
understand
that Western Surety would
resolve
the matter
through the interpleader
jurisdiction.
We note
that
you have appealed
the Judge's decision
to refuse
the stay of the
summary judgment
proceedings.
It
is my understanding
that
an
appropriate
bond should be filed
in connection
with that appeal
to
stay the execution
of the Baker judgment.
To that end, we would
appreciate
verification
that the appropriate
bond has been
filed
so that further
collection
by garnishment
of Western Surety
agents
in this
state
can be discontinued
in light
of the
appellate
posture
of the
case.
If you have any questions
concerning
not hesitate
to contact
me.

this

correspondence

please

Sincerely,
HAROLD C. YANCEY, CPCU
Insurance
Commissioner

Kendall R.
Surfass^/
Market Conduct Staff
KRS:lm
1182L

Counsel

do

liability when w e h a u ixled t h e Interpleader Actn;ii;i which
^ j w a s speci fical 1 y to t a k e care of that.

I b e l i e v e that t h e

3

A p p e a l c a n b e c o m p l e t e l y unnecessary;.

4

t h e Bakers to t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of thei t, J u d g m e n t as

5

a r e entit

6

If w e were to limit
they

*-Q r e c o v e r a g a i n s t t h e 3ond F u n d s .
Your H o n o r , in t h e p r e v i o u s h e a r i n g on December

- | 1 9 t h I rid i cated that j oi i wer e i lot ruling o n p r i o r i t y , that
8

that w a s not b e f o r e y o u . W e d i d n ' t k n o w that t h e Bakers

9

simply because they o b t a i n e d a J u d g m e n t fii

10

entitled to priority*

11

has ruled on that , T h e r e ' s no tit ih c a s e o n p o i n t

12

submit, Your H o n o r , t h a t Interpleader

13 I

W e still d o n ' t know that

one
-

I

iias properly filed in

ter a n d that t h e B a k e r s h a v e a Summary J u d g m e n t

14

against Western Surety.

15

limited to the ?;;inl(fH)rt Bond V\A\A

16

b e l i e v e something n e e d s to b e d o n e w i t h that*

17

O r d e r needs to b e d o n e l i m i t i n g e x e c u t i o n t o t h e i r

18

involvement i n the In terpleader Actioh or the Order that

19

w a s entered n e e d s to be r e v i s e d t o e x p l i c i t l y set forth

20

w h a t w a s intended to be e n t e r e d .

21 i
22 I

But W e s t e r n S u r e t y ' s liability is
-nu.l u' this time T
Either an

- I wo ii J, a stiijiim, it o n that b a & i s , Y o u r H o n o r .
THE COURT:

First of all let m e s t a t e t h i s .

In

23 | r e a d i n g your m e m o r a n d u m s I w a s concerned Miat I rli'T.11 pven
24 I know i r r fiaw-> -Jurisdiction in this matter but, L am going
25 j t o rule and I still t h i n k t h e r e ' s a serious q u e s t i o n .

I
19

know there's a serious question and whether I have
jurisdiction with that Appeal up there, of course they can
grant me the right to make it, but I think right now the
case is really in their hands.

So, I think there's a very

serious question there,
MR. BRAITHWAITE:
Honor,

May I make one comment, Your

A phone call yesterday afternoon to the Supreme

Court indicated that this was not docketed yet.
THE COURT:
that.

That might be.

I don't want to get on

All I know what you said in your memorandum, you

said it's on appeal to the Supreme Court.
MR. PARKEN:

I want the record to be absolutely

clear on that point, Your Honor.
jurisdictional.

I think it's

The Utah Supreme Court's records, and I

checked with them this morning, indicate that Mr.
Braithwaite's appeal in this case was docketed in the Utah
Supreme Court on February 11th under Case No. 870059.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BRAITHWAITE.

Well, there you are.
I don't think that takes

jurisdiction away from Rule 60(b), Your honor, that's only
in Rule 60(a).
THE COURT:

Well, this may be another matter

you're to be contesting, I don't know, but I have a serious
—

very serious question, I'll restate it, whether I have

jurisdiction.
20
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1

I

Now, going back to the first situation of; when

2 . '. •
3

icr

--:;... me of course on the Summary Judgment, and I
remember exactly what was presented to me at that

4

time

w remember ymn beinq in hen* and t do remember

5

::r-.

h* judgment,,

6

whether you said, and I'm not saying you didn't, whether

7

you said

« I *::<**
*

1 don't remember specifically

- I lu» interpleader action had been

7

remember some statement being made that the

oonding company wasn't sufficiently Satisfied that they had

10 | liability «it that' point.
ti
12

Something to that effect.

Now, other than that
~

r»t remember much about

* ^ as one of the tn •.

13 I

entitled to proceed with their case.

If the

14

Interpleader Action had been perfected in al ] probabili*-

15

would have granted .i «ir,;.iy tiiere

16

wanted to look

17

«

memor

19

it was —•

20

I maybe

the law on it:,

MR. BRAITHWAITE:

18

I ilon't know.

THE COURT:

If Your Honor would review I hie
v

)tinn i think you will see that

I know what y o u ' r e say I ruj -

I m saying

21

tiriciti i :II,,J "ni'i.ini" the Summary Judgment because of the fact

22

that they were there.

23

had come

->*
25

I

r~ -

They were befote the Court.

They

aad the i r act 11 mi f i I *jd f pet fected and

Interpleader Action had been filed, which
I don1!; remember if I knew or didn't Hnow that it was
21

certainly filed just for the purpose of granting the stay
and still the bonding company was questioning whether they
had liability in this situation.

But I am of the opinion,

and I would so rule, that the judgment awarded to the
plaintiff against Western Surety would only go to against
the bond.

Western Surety is not liable for more money than

what they have contracted to pay out and that's the bond
amount.

When they paid this into Court under Interpleader

Action, of course that's what you're on the Supreme Court,
whether the plaintiff can —

are entitled to that money

first since they've got their judgment and whether they
have to go into the Interpleader Action and get their
money.
It's my opinion that a Judge Moffitt had
jurisdiction to grant a stay in that action since that
money was then paid into the Court and the Interpleader
action filed with that Court.
wise.

Course he thought other-

Who has the jurisdiction to grant that stay is a

question.

But I am saying that I definitely, and I'm

ruling, that the plaintiff is only entitled to release
against the bond.

And whether they can get in and get the

money first or whether it has to go through the
Interpleader Action, the Supreme Court kicks it back here,
I guess we'll have to look at it again if they want to rule
on it, then I guess they'll make the decision.
22
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MR. BRAITHWAITE:
THE COURT:

Arid

Thank you, Your Honor.
as r say, maybe this whole Ruling

of mi ne is mute because they have jurisdiction. But I am
stating that position.
MR. PARKEN:

wondering if the Court wants to

specify so as to avoid objections to the Order under what
Rule Court: is amending its earlier judgment t-n I imir, as
to the bond.

r-

MR. BRAITHWAITE:

Is the Court amending its prior

order or entering a new order?
THE COURT:

Well

~ ruling

- I donft know what

you •-- T haven't read your judgment • If your judgment just
says a blanket judgm^n* aqa tns1' Western Surety then I think
-hat's incorrect.

I think you're entitled to Judgment

against the amount of the bond of Western Surety or the
bond i tsel f. A i id whether this is —

of course you're to

state the alteration I guess there's a 10-day situation
there, but 1 think the judgment itself i,s voidr dud 1 think
under Ru J *? —MR. BRAITHWAITE:
THE COURT:

60(b).

Tn vn id judgment.

i" think the

judgment, itself i s void.
MR PARKEN:

That's the basis of your ru.

THE COURT:

if rh.it1 s nie way 11: '• s worded,

haven't read your judgment

I'm saying that my judgment
23
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would only go against Western Surety against the bond.

And

I don't know how your judgment reads.
MR. PARKEN:

And the order should reflect that

that's pursuant to Rule 60(b)?
THE COURT:
right, counsel?

Well, I haven't checked it.

I know judgment —

Is that

60(b) says if a

judgment is void, isn't that the one?
MR. BRAITHWAITE:
that are void.

60(b) sub 5 refers to judgments

60(b) sub 1 refers to mistakes,

inadvertence, excusable neglect.
THE COURT:

I think it's really both.

If you've

got it worded such that it's against them I think it's a
mistake.

I think it's a void judgment.
MR. PARKEN:

Okay.

MR. BRAITHWAITE:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay.
(THEREUPON, the Motion was
concluded.)

24
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UNITED STATE OF AMERICA

State of Utah
ss.
County of Salt 1 alee

I, GEOFFREY J. BUTLER, Clerk of the Supreme Court of tHe State of Utah, do hereby

certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of ttye judgmuU luiuluiml
Stipulation and Motion for Dismissal of Appeal, Order of Dismissal
and copy of the Supreme Court Remittitur |m Case No. B'/UUby.
in the foregoing entitled action, now of record and on file in My office.
In Testimony Whereof, I h^tve hereunto set my hand

and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court this

the

day of

TWENTIETH
OCTOBER

^
87
A.D. 19

A

GEOFFREY J. BUTLER
Clerk, Supreme Court

FILED
MAR 2 61987
John N. Braithwaiter Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Templef Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

C|

e*> Supreme Court, tf ah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Respondents ,

STIPULATION AND MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,

Case No. 870059
District Court
Civil No. C86-7427

Defendant/Appellant•
Defendant and appellant, Western Surety Company, by and
through its counsel, John N. Braithwaite, and plaintiffs and
respondents, George M. Baker and Delia A. Baker, by and through
their counsel, John D. Parken, hereby stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

The above captioned appeal, referenced by Case No.

870059, may be dismissed.

Each p a r t y shall bear its : owi i c<: :»st :s ai i< 3 attorney 1 s
.,is a p p e a l .

7/, /Z/ttszLx/jL

JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
IANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Western Surety Company

Date

MareJ, 2 3

/f?7

for Ylaintiffs/Respondents
M. Baker and Delia A. Baker

»at«

<H3M**&{

MOTION
Based upon the foregoing stipulation,
d e f e n d a n t / a p p e l l a n t W e s t e r n Suiet.y t'ompdiiy, by .HKI through its
counsel, John N. Braithwaite, respectfully moves this Court for
an order dismissing this appeal.
DATED this

2^-^-

day of

March

r 1987.

HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

JOHN N. BRAITHWAITE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Western Surety Company
1/86-600D.33

John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE M. BAKER and
DELLA A. BAKER,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY;
CRAIG A. PAPA-DAKIS,
individually and d/b/a
"AUTO-MART"; and AUTO-MART,
an unregistered fictitious name,

Case No, 870059
District Court
Civil No. C86-7427

Defendant/Appellant•
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and the motion
of the appellant Western Surety Company for the dismissal of this
appeal, and pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-referenced appeal is
dismissed.
DATED this

.-*-/•?
f?t?

day of March, 1987.
BY THE SUPREME COURT:

/fSSfc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a I i m-> ,nv1 "uitoct copy
of
day of

ie mailed, postage prepaid, this
fibret\

s^*-1

., 1987, to the following:

John D. Parken
Marcella L. Keck
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

??• ^Cu£%**>//£
1/86-7 4 m.

_o_

IM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

—00OO00-

Regular February Term,

1987

George M. Baker and
Delia A. Baker,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

March 26,

1987

REMITTITUR
No. 8 70059
District Wo. C86

Western Surety Company;
Craig A. Papa-Dakls,
individually and dba
"Auto-Mart"; and Auto-Mart
and Unregistered fictitious name,
Defendants and Appellant

Stipulation to dismiss, having been considered, it
ordered that the same be, and hereby is, granted.

Issued:

March 31, 1987

Record:

None

SYNOPSIS OF FIDELITY & DEPOSIT £0. OF MP.
v. SANTA MONICA FIN, CO.,

t. Ca I . Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)

> •

In this case, a surety had issued $ $5,000
motor vehicle dealer,

f

u .

; und became thejsubject

claims exceeding the bond penalty.

,i

to a

multiple

Prior ti the filing of the

interpleader in that case, one of tiif» <:.l jimani K filed an
independent act. iun against the surety and the dealer.

Upon

application of the surety, an injunction wag entered, ei
the claimant from, further prosecuting its action.

In affirming

-!e granting of the injunction, -he appellate court cited an
earlier case and stated:
"The very purpose of this action wa$ to avoid a
multiplicity of suits and to ascertain and
equitably distribute the available bond fund
among those who are entitled to share therein.
The proportions and extent to which each is
entitled to participate in that fund, subject
to the maximum liability prescribed by the
bond, is measured by the proportionate loss
sustained by each on account of the
derelictions of the broker.w
[Citations
omitted] In aid of such jurisdiction, an
injunction against the prosecution cj>f other
actions, pending the determination of the
rights of the various claimants, may properly
be granted by the court in the exercise of its
discretion.
Id. at

2 17,
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